








This thesis is dedicated to my beloved parents who -together- set a new
standard for parenting. Words are simply not enough to describe the role you
both played towards my life and career success. Thank you for all the
motivation, inspiration and empowerment you have given me.
I also dedicate this work to my grandmother, who always remembers me in her
prayers and continuously draws the smile on my face, and my brothers, my
source of enthusiasm and happiness.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for my thesis
adviser, Dr. Sami Zhioua, who not only guided me throughout the idea
generation, experiments’ execution and write-up of my thesis, but also for being
the main reason why I decided to pursue my master’s degree and career in
Information and Cyber Security. My thanks extend to the committee members,
Dr. Moataz Ahmed and Dr. Sajjad Mahmood for their continuous and valuable
support. I do appreciate the KFUPM community for the educational experience




LIST OF TABLES ix
LIST OF FIGURES xi
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) xiii
ABSTRACT (ARABIC) xv
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Tracking Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Evolution of Web Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Fingerprinting and Canvas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 10
2.1 Web Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Fingerprinting via Canvas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.1 Canvas Prevalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.2 Canvas Distinguishing Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Significant Fingerprinting Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CHAPTER 3 HTML CANVAS: OVERVIEW AND PREVA-
LENCE 25
vi
3.1 Canvas Feature Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1.1 Concrete Canvas Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1.2 Attack Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Canvas Prevalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.1 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.2 Initial Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.3 Revised Definition and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.4 Algorithms Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
CHAPTER 4 CANVAS DISTINGUISHING CAPABILITY
ANALYSIS 45
4.1 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2 Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4 Results and Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.5 General Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.6 Why Canvas is a Reliable Fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
CHAPTER 5 CANVAS FINGERPRINTING FOR ATTACK DE-
TECTION 71
5.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.2 Proposed Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.3 Empirical Study of the Fake Account Detection Application . . . 77
5.4 Proof of Concept for the Session Hijacking Prevention Application 79
5.5 Existing Techniques to Detect Fake Accounts and Prevent Session
Hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
vii
CHAPTER 6 ATTACKING PRIVACY USING CANVAS FIN-
GERPRINTING 84
6.1 Linking a guest user to a logged in user . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.2 Conclude a person or entity owns several accounts . . . . . . . . . 86
6.3 Conclude that a user owns several devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.4 Attribute activities done across different web applications to the
same user despite using different devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.5 Confirmation of identity speculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.6 Privacy of Tor Browser Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
CHAPTER 7 RESEARCH VALIDATION, REPLICATION, CON-
CLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 96
7.1 Research Validation and Threats to Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.2 Replication and Reproducing Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101





APPENDIX A  CANVAS SAMPLES
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Canvas Fingerprinting Prevalence According to Different Research 17
2.2 Bias in the Various Datasets in the proportion of Operating Systems
Against the Actual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Shannon Normalized Entropy of the Three Major Fingerprinting
Datasets in Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Usage of Canvas Elements by top 500, 1K, 10K and 100K Websites 35
3.2 Portion of the top 100K Websites that Contain <canvas> Element
in the HTML by 10K intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 Portion of the top 100K Websites that Use Canvas by 10K Intervals
According to the Revised Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 Usage of Canvas According to the Revised Definition by top 500,
1K, 10K and 100K Websites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.5 Estimated Canvas Prevalence by Type of Usage . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1 The Samples of the Non-Canvas Fingerprints We Gathered . . . . 49
4.2 Characteristics of the Canvas Samples Gathered . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Number and Percentage of Submissions per Operating System . . 53
4.4 Number and Percentage of Submissions per Browser . . . . . . . . 53
4.5 Normalized Entropy of the Major Fingerprinting Attributes on
Three Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.6 Normalized Entropy of Random 90% Folds of Each Canvas Sample 62
4.7 Reliability of our Reported Canvas Samples’ Normalized Entropy 63
ix
4.8 Normalized Shannons Entropy for the Top 4 AMIUNIQUES At-
tributes [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.1 Expected and Actual Results [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
x
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 The 5 Canvas Samples used by Mowery [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 The Canvas Sample reported by Acar [4] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 The Canvas Sample used by Laperdrix in AmIUnique [1] . . . . . 19
2.4 The Canvas Sample used by Gomez-Boix [5] . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1 Image Panning Implemented Using Canvas API [6] . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Flash-free Version of speedtest.net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3 Output of The Canvas Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 Landing Page of the Data Gathering Website . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2 Number of Distinct Canvas Values per Sample . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3 Overall vs. Mean Entropy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.4 Our Enhanced Canvas Sample (Canvas 20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.5 Number of Distinct Values per Non-Canvas Fingerprints . . . . . 69
5.1 Canvas Storing Stage of the Detection Process [2] . . . . . . . . . 74
5.2 Repetition Checking Stage of the Fake Accounts Detection Process
[2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3 Checking Stage of the Session Hijacking Prevention Process . . . . 76
5.4 Simple Website with Registration Functionality . . . . . . . . . . 78
6.1 Linking a guest user to a logged in user . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.2 Conclude a person or entity owns several accounts . . . . . . . . . 87
6.3 Conclude a user owns several devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.4 Attribute Activities to Users Across Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
xi
6.5 Confirmation of identity speculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.6 Canvas Fingerprint Alert in Tor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.7 Paint Application Based on Canvas Only Displaying the Alert
When Saving the Drawing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.8 Canvas Paint Application Failing to Store the Drawing in Tor . . 94




TITLE OF STUDY: Canvas Fingerprinting: A State of the Art
MAJOR FIELD: Security and Information Assurance
DATE OF DEGREE: February, 2019
Web applications’ operators have many motivations to track users and gather as
much user identifiable information about them as possible. With about three quar-
ters of the web pages including third party trackers, privacy continues to be one
of the major concerns to web users. This research is mainly focused on a tracking
technique called Canvas fingerprinting. Canvas is an HTML element that allows to
dynamically render 2D shapes and bitmap images. It is one of several technologies
introduced in HTML5 making it a serious alternative to Flash which is being dis-
continued because of its multitude of security vulnerabilities. Interestingly, Canvas
can be used for fingerprinting browsers, and hence for tracking users. This thesis
is a state of the art of Canvas fingerprinting in which we explore the functional-
ity the Canvas element was originally introduced for, provide updated results about
the prevalence of Canvas in the web, its distinguishing capabilities, its positive (at-
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tack detection) and negative (attacks on privacy) use-cases. The major findings
of this study is that Canvas is very common among web applications (1 out of 4
websites are using Canvas for all constructive and destructive purposes), while it
was recently reported that the Canvas usage for fingerprinting is (10.44%), which
demonstrates the significance of Canvas and cost of disabling it, and by optimizing
Canvas elements we could improve the distinguishing entropy from 0.49 to 0.83,
which exceeds the distinguishing capability of the 18 non-Canvas fingerprints we
studied. We performed several assessments that show the reliability of this re-
ported entropy including cross data validation and benchmarking with other major
fingerprinting datasets in the literature. The two novel constructive use cases we
propose for utilizing Canvas are Using Canvas fingerprinting for the detection of
fake accounts creation on web applications, and for session hijacking prevention.
We studied the effectiveness of both techniques through an empirical study and the
implementation of a proof of concept, respectively. We finally explored five sce-
narios where Canvas fingerprinting can be exploited to attack users privacy even





Privacy on the web continues to be a concern for many web users, as the majority
of web services strive to track users and get hold of as much of their personal
identifiable information as possible [7]. This information can include the products
web users purchase, the people with whom they interact, the websites they fre-
quently visit, and their areas of interest. Although the purpose of gathering such
information is commercial in many of the cases, it can easily jeopardize users’
privacy. For example, a web application may be able to tell that the owners of
two different accounts belong to roommates if the two accounts are being accessed
regularly from the same computer [8]. According to a study conducted on 850,000
web users and 144 million web page visits, 77.4% of the web page loads contain
implanted trackers [9]. The same study pointed out that Google and Facebook
trackers are the most commonly used ones, as Google Analytics was found in 46%
of the included websites and Facebook Connect in 21.9% of them. If a user visits
multiple web applications where a third party tracker is planted, the tracker can
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create a detailed user profile and keep updating it with every visit. With this,
trackers can obtain highly personal information, like health information, finan-
cial situation, religious and political views. It has been reported that third-party
trackers monitor to know the users who visit a web page that belongs to Mayo
Clinic, which provides information about HIV tests, and by this the trackers can
tell if a user clicks the button to arrange an appointment [10].
A quantitative survey conducted by the market research agency CG Selecties
on 924 respondents concluded that there is a relationship between consumers’
privacy and their behaviour [11]. People are generally concerned about their
privacy, and it is critical to them to be able to stay in control of their personal
data and the information they decide to share. The more privacy concerns the
consumers have, the more negative their attitude is towards the collection of their
data. For example, the consumers would adjust the settings of their smart phones
and disable the location services, sacrificing the features that comes with it, in
order to prevent their browsing from being tracked. In other words, when the
consumers do not feel in control of their data, it can trigger a negative behavior
and the consumers will resist and try to avoid it.
1.1 Tracking Motivations
There are many motivations why a web application would track users and gather
identifiable information about them. These motivations go beyond the targeted
advertisements to serve the web users giving them personalized and seamless ex-
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perience. This includes showing relevant content when a web user searches for
general search key words in a search engine, as well as giving the right movie sug-
gestions in Netflix, products recommendations in Amazon, and business reviews in
Yelp [12]. However, such personalized experience facilitates price discrimination.
Hannak et al. found evidence that nine out of sixteen e-commerce websites in-
cluded in their study present customizing prices as a result of user tracking [12]. It
has been shown that the web users’ geographical location can change the returning
price by up to 166%, the wealth by up to 400%, and the referring website by up to
50% [13]. Mikians et al. performed a crowd sourcing study where 340 users surfed
the web, while information was gathered using a browser extension, showing that
many retailers give product prices for returning users that range between 10% and
30% [14]. Moreover, tracking users and gathering identifiable information helps
in assessing the financial credibility of people. Some financial organizations use
as much as 8,000 data points in order to evaluate a loan application, including
data from the social network accounts of a person, e-commerce websites, and user
behaviors like whether a user spent adequate time reading about the loan details
before applying [15]. Further more, Insurance companies like Allfinanz and TCP
LifeSystems can utilize user information to determine the probability of a per-
son getting a disease or making an accident based on information coming from
credit card spending, magazine subscriptions and customer surveys [16]. Also,
web tracking serves government surveillance. It has been reported that govern-
ment spying agencies like National Security Agency (NSA) utilize the third party
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trackers to spy on individuals, and even know several aspects including the user
location data [17]. These agencies can also have the authority to force companies
to share web users records [17].
Previous work in the literature revealed that even when web clients clear cook-
ies or use private browsing, they are still not completely protected from being
tracked. In fact, clearing cookies for every request may be an identifying behavior
that distinguishes the hosts from others. Web users who wish not to be tracked
can take more tracking counter measures such as modifying the default settings,
using proxies, using anonymous routing, or a combination of these techniques [18].
1.2 Evolution of Web Tracking
Web tracking techniques are increasingly sophisticated and are made more per-
vasive, intrusive, and persistent. The authors of [19] point out that using IP
addresses to track web users is inadequate for several reasons. One of the reasons
is that if more than one user are browsing the web behind the same Network
Address Translation (NAT) domain, they are very likely to have the same IP
address, which makes it difficult to distinguish between them. Another reason is
that when a user uses Tor, an adversary will see different IP addresses for different
requests from the same user. Cookies have been used for tracking purposes for
a long time. However, because cookies lack persistence, and because users can
erase them easily, adversaries designed more persistent techniques including Ev-
ercookies and the use of cookie syncing in conjunction with Evercookies [4]. Flash
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cookies (also known as Evercookies) can be utilized to regenerate HTTP cookies
removed by the user via a technique called cookie re-spawning. Interestingly, a
study found that 41 out of the 100 most popular websites stored flash cookies with
content matching with the regular cookies [20]. The re-spawning technique starts
when a user visits the website in which the technique is implemented, which in
turn creates an ID and stored it in both the HTTP cookies and the flash cookies.
When the user erases the HTTP cookies, the website reads the value stored in the
flash cookie and places a new HTTP cookie with the same ID.
1.3 Fingerprinting and Canvas
Fingerprinting works by requesting a browser’s version and configuration infor-
mation that are available to the web application upon request, and connecting
this information with a device or user account to identify users when they visit
later. In his research about device fingerprinting, Eckersley investigated the ex-
tent to which web browsers are vulnerable to fingerprinting [21]. The researcher
implemented a fingerprinting algorithm that retrieves browsers version and con-
figuration information, and according to the collected sample of fingerprints, he
showed that if we pick a fingerprint randomly, not more than 1 out of 286,777 of
other browsers would share the same fingerprint. The same research suggests that
fingerprints can be used as global identifiers. They can be thought of as cookies
that cannot be deleted except with a large enough configuration change to break
the fingerprint. The research also suggests using a combination of a fingerprint
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and IP address to regenerate cookies in a similar way to the website that use flash
cookies to regenerate HTTP cookies [4], or use the IP address and the fingerprint
on their own to replace the functionality of cookies.
It has been reported that an authentication technology has been widely used
for e-commerce and online bank to minimize fraud, which come at the price of
privacy. When a bank user logs in to the bank website, they provide their user-
name and password, but in addition to that, the website checks some fingerprints
to identify the device and make sure the person owning the account is the same
one accessing, assuming that most users use the same device for banking [8]. Fin-
gerprinting in these technologies works by requesting a computer for some details
such as browser type, language, time zone, cookie ID, flash ID, and IP address. If
there is a sufficient number of matches, the account is granted access.
A later research published in 2016 proposed a fingerprinting script composed
of 17 attributes. This research was based on a data set of 118,934 fingerprint
collected by the website AmIUnique.org [1]. The aim of launching the website
was to gather as many samples of fingerprints as possible to study the diversity
of fingerprints. The research showed the effectiveness of each attribute in distin-
guishing browsers by reporting the number of distinct values and unique values
of each attribute in the dataset. The research also demonstrated the effectiveness
of the fingerprinting of mobile devices in spite of the less number of fonts and
plugins available. In addition, several research papers reported that Canvas was
one of the most distinguishing attributes of the fingerprint [4] [1] [3].
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1.4 Contributions
The contributions of our work can be summarized as follows:
1. We studied Canvas presence in the top 100,000 Alexa sites to find out that
almost one out of four websites use Canvas in the landing page of the website.
This indicates that blocking the Canvas feature for the sake of privacy on
the browser level would result in functionality failure on a significant number
of websites, and hence researchers need to find other creative solutions to
protect users privacy.
2. We designed 23 Canvas samples with various components and characteristics
and analyzed the impact of each on the distinguishing capability of Canvas
fingerprinting, and came up with observations and guidelines for designing
optimal fingerprinting Canvas samples.
3. We proposed an enhanced Canvas sample to use in fingerprinting users,
which increased the normalized entropy for Canvas fingerprinting with the
widely used sample from 0.490 when calculating the entropy in our dataset
(and 0.491 in the AmIUnique dataset with the same sample [1]) to a nor-
malized entropy of 0.837 when using our enhanced sample. This normalized
entropy achieved by our enhanced Canvas sample is higher than any Canvas
and non-Canvas fingerprint used in AmIUnique [1] and Panopticlick [21].
4. We proposed a technique that utilizes Canvas fingerprinting for the detection
of fake accounts creation on web applications. We carried out an empirical
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study that showed the effectiveness of the proposed technique, resulting in
6.67% of false positives and 7.44% false negatives.
5. We proposed a technique that utilizes Canvas fingerprinting for the preven-
tion of session hijacking. We built a fully functioning proof of concept to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the technique.
6. We studied five practical scenarios and explained how Canvas fingerprinting
could be taken advantage of in order to attack users’ privacy even when
using different devices or visiting separate web applications.
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature related
to Canvas prevalence, distinguishing capability and major fingerprinting datasets.
Chapter 3 studies the Canvas HTML element, its history, support, what a web
developer can use Canvas to build, and the extent to which Canvas is present
in web applications, in order to understand the impact of disabling the feature
for the sake of privacy. Chapter 4 presents an empirical study to demonstrate
the possibility of enhancing the Canvas fingerprinting samples to exceed the dis-
tinguishing capabilities of other fingerprinting techniques. Chapter 5 proposes
and assesses novel constructive applications to utilize Canvas fingerprinting: the
detection of fake accounts creation on web applications, and the prevention of ses-
sion hijacking. Chapter 6 spots the light on five different scenarios where Canvas
fingerprinting can be exploited to attack the privacy of web users, and discusses
some issues Tor browser users face when visiting websites with Canvas content.
Chapter 7 points out how we validated our findings, what threat we see to the
8
validity of our results, demonstrates how to replicate our empirical studies, and




This chapter sheds the light over the relevant literature to our research. It starts
by explaining web fingerprinting as a tracking technique, how it is classified, and
pointing out the main focus of our research. It then explains why we chose to
study Canvas as opposed to the other fingerprinting techniques. Afterwards, it
reviews the relevant work done on Canvas prevalence and the earlier findings,
and how these results complement our findings. This chapter also discusses the
enhancement of Canvas samples used for fingerprinting over time, and explains
the gap left unanswered, which we address in future chapters. Finally, this chapter
reviews three large scale fingerprinting datasets, pointing out the targets, findings




When studying web fingerprinting for tracking users, it is important to note that
fingerprinting is not a single tracking technique. In fact, web fingerprinting can be
done using a combination of fingerprinting techniques. Those techniques can be
of the same type or different types that are combined to achieve better tracking of
web users. Hence, it is important to understand the various types of fingerprint-
ing techniques, and how they are classified in the literature. In their research,
Upathilake et al. studied web browser fingerprinting and focused on providing a
logical way of classifying the different techniques [22]. The outcome of their clas-
sification was the following four categories. First, Browser Specific fingerprinting
which is associated to the browsing environment. Algorithms belonging to this
category utilize java or flash to obtain browser specific information that is used
as fingerprints like resolution, User Agent, list of fonts, HTTP Accept, and list
of plugins. The weaknesses mentioned are the instability of these fingerprints as
small changes like installing a new font or changing the monitors resolution can af-
fect the fingerprint [23], and the inability of distinguishing identically configured
devices [24]. The Second category is Canvas fingerprinting which utilizes pixel
data of rendered images at the web client device, which is the main focus of our
research. The third category is JavaScript Engine fingerprinting that performs
conformance testing such as Sputnik test suite [25] and matches the failed tests of
a browser to the browser version known for failing these test, as suggested by Mu-
lazzani et al. [26]. This fingerprinting technique can detect modified user-Agent
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strings and even identifies Tor browser users [27]. Finally, Cross-browser finger-
printing is similar in concept to the browser specific fingerprinting except that it
uses JavaScript to obtain the information, instead of relying on Java or Flash.
Hence, it shares the same weakness of the inability to distinguish devices with
the same configurations. Finally, Cross-browser fingerprinting is similar in con-
cept to the browser specific fingerprinting except that it uses JavaScript to obtain
the information, instead of relying on Java or Flash. Hence, it shares the same
weakness of the inability to distinguish devices with the same configurations. It
is important not to confuse this last type (i.e. cross browser fingerprinting) with
the cross-device tracking studied extensively by Brookman et al., which uses a
combination of web tracking techniques including several fingerprinting and non-
fingerprinting techniques aiming to track users and link users on their different
devices [28]. Companies specialized in cross device tracking work on developing
graphs which link users to their different devices to provide these graph to other
parties who subscribe to this service and are interested in tracking users.
The previous fingerprinting techniques of different classifications are applicable
to both desktops and mobile devices. However, since mobile devices are more
likely to have the exact same hardware and software configurations, and due to
the lack of plug-ins in mobile devices, it became necessary find alternatives to these
fingerprinting techniques. Bojinov et al. utilized the components more relevant to
mobile devices to come up two implementations to track web users: one through
analyzing the mobile device accelerometer behavior and calibration errors which
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do not require specific user permissions to obtain, while the other by emitting
sounds using different frequencies and recording them back to analyze values like
sound amplitude and distortions to use as fingerprints [29]. Canvas fingerprinting
is the major focus of our research, as this research analyze it from various aspects
like prevalence, distinguishing capability, constructive and destructive use cases.
In our research, we also considered many other fingerprints that are part of browser
fingerprinting and cross-browser fingerprinting in the previous classification in
order to confirm the findings of other research and to compare their distinguishing
capability with Canvas. We do not consider JavaScript Engine fingerprinting,
accelerometer fingerprinting nor spearker-microphone fingerprinting.
2.2 Fingerprinting via Canvas
In this research, our focus is to study the different aspects related to one type
of fingerprints from the previous classifications (i.e. Canvas fingerprint) from
the perspective of prevalence, distinguishing capability, positive and negative use
cases. There are many reasons why we select to study Canvas fingerprinting as a
tracking technique. Some of which are the several positive characteristics reported
by Mowery [3], including consistency in the value of the fingerprint coming from
the same device and browser, the high entropy, transparency to the web users,
and not requiring permission to obtain. Another reason why we chose to study
Canvas fingerprinting is that despite the observed drop in the entropy of several
fingerprinting characteristics due to the changes in the web trends, like the entropy
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drop for the list of plugins with the decreasing support especially in mobile devices
[1] [5], we continue to see stable and high distinguishing capability for Canvas
fingerprint. Moreover, Alaca et al. studied 29 types of fingerprints and classified
according to their properties, to show that fingerprinting by Canvas has high
repeatability of fingerprint values, consumes low device resources and is ranked
medium in terms of the distinguishing information it carries [30], despite being
vulnerable to client spoofing like any fingerprint that requires client side execution
of JavaScript which returns the output to the server.
In addition to that, we find Canvas to be one of the tracking techniques that
has high potential to enhance, as we can see in the different research in reviewed
in Section 2.2.2 where more complex Canvas samples are used over time for better
entropy, and as we extensively show in Chapter 4 using 23 different samples to
study how the components of Canvas can affect the entropy. The following two
sections review the prevalence of Canvas as reported in the literature by different
research between the years 2014 and 2016, and show the enhancement done to the
Canvas samples that are used in fingerprinting over time.
2.2.1 Canvas Prevalence
After Mowery discovered Canvas as an effective, high entropy fingerprinting tech-
nique to track users without any permission required in 2012 [3], websites started
to deploy Canvas fingerprinting gradually. That is why several researchers started
looking at Canvas prevalence among websites on the web. In an effort to find out
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the prevalence and effectiveness of post cookies tracking techniques, Acar et al.
studied the extent to which the HTML Canvas feature is used in fingerprinting
and tracking users [4]. In their experiment, they used an instrumented Firefox
browser that was modified to log function calls that could indicate a website is
fingerprinting users through Canvas, and crawled the top 100,000 Alexa sites look-
ing for function calls which are used in fingerprinting. The results indicate that
over 5.5% of sites ran scripts to fingerprint users through Canvas on their home
pages. Acar filtered out false positives by removing websites that do not have both
Canvas drawing and pixel retrieving calls coming from the same URL as they are
not likely to be used for tracking, the Canvas images with very few pixels as they
are not effective enough to be used for tracking, and the Canvas with images in a
lossy compression format that can render differently at different times.
In 2017, Englehardt et al. presented on of the most comprehensive stud-
ies of web tracking ever done [31]. In their study, they covered as many
as 15 types of tracking measurement, including stateful and stateless track-
ing methods. Fingerprints studied included Canvas Fingerprinting, Audio Con-
text fingerprinting and Battery API Fingerprinting. They utilized the an open
source tool that they built for web privacy measurement and named OpenWPM
(https://github.com/citp/OpenWPM). It is noteworthy that Englehardt et
al. built on the 2014 study [4], and added more elimination criteria to reduce
false positives. This explains some of the reduction in the Canvas fingerprinting
prevalence reported Englehardt et al. Some of the added criteria to consider the
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Canvas a false positive is that the text written into Canvas has less than 10 dis-
tinct characters since the Canvases used in fingerprinting are likely to have more
characters for better distinguishing capability, and that the script uses an API
call like addEventListener, save or restore that are typically used for legitimate
purposes. The reported prevalence of Canvas was 4.03% for the top 10,000, and
2.61% for the top 100,000 Alexa websites, respectively.
In 2016, Le et al. performed an empirical study to detect the prevalence of
Canvas fingerprinting among the top 10,000 Alexa websites [32]. Their research
was a pioneering one in analyzing and reporting the websites that use obfuscated
tracking along with those that do not. Obfuscated tracking refers to a commonly
used process to hide the JavaScript code making it very difficult to read, modify
and reuse, as well as less visible to pattern detecting techniques [33]. There
are even free web services that can be used to perform obfuscation and mimic
the JavaScript code producing the same exact execution outcome [34] [35]. The
methodology Le et al. proposed and utilized is based on a dynamic analysis of
the JavaScript API calls performed by the browser in comparison with the source
code sent to the browser by the website in order to detect obfuscated tracking.
When applying the proposed methodology, it was found that 10.44% of the top
10,000 Alexa websites use Canvas fingerprinting in the home page of the website,
out of which 2.25% use obfuscation techniques.
In our research, we use the results of Le et al. in [32] to calculate the estimated
prevalence of Canvas used for legitimate purposes, as they are the most recent and
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close in time to our experiments, which means that the Canvas deployment would
have changed the least compared to other earlier research. Also, the results of
[32] proved to be more accurate as in the comparison done by Le et al. showing
that in the top 100 websites, the methodology used by Englehardt et al. in [31]
results in false positives (6 websites that contain Canvas were missed out of 8).
Table 2.1 summarizes the finding of previous research on the Canvas fingerprinting
prevalence over time among the top Alexa websites.
Table 2.1: Canvas Fingerprinting Prevalence According to Different Research
Author Year Websites Crawling Prevalence (top Prevalence (top
Published Date 10K Websites) 100K Websites)
Acar et al. [4] 2014 May 2014 4.93% 5.73%
Englehardt et al. [31] 2017 January 2016 4.03% 2.61%
Le et al. [32] 2017 April 2016 10.44% -
Chapter 3.2 of this research complements the previously reported results about
Canvas fingerprinting prevalence to show the overall prevalence of Canvas on the
web for all purposes, and provides an estimation of how much of this prevalence
is in fact for legitimate purposes.
2.2.2 Canvas Distinguishing Capability
Reviewing the research done on Canvas fingerprinting over time, we notice that the
Canvas samples being used for fingerprinting have been increasing in complexity.
When discovering Canvas as a fingerprinting technique in 2012, Mowery gathered
Canvas fingerprints from 300 web users using the 5 samples in Figure 2.1 [3].
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Mowery used a pangram (i.e. a sentence that contains all the alphabetical letters)
with some punctuation in the 5 samples. The font in the first two samples was
Arial with font sizes of 18pt and 20pt. The font in the two following samples
was Sirin Stencil (imported from Google Web Fonts) with font sizes of 12pt and
15pt. Finally, the last sample’s font is a a fake font name that was used to study
the effect of the fallback handling of fonts by different browsers. These Canvas
samples are relatively simple and result in low entropy with distinct fingerprint
values between 43 and 50 from the 300 users who were fingerprinted. Meaning
that the fingerprints gathered are able to distribute the users into 43 to 50 groups
of users (depending on which sample is used), each group has a distinct fingerprint
value.
Figure 2.1: The 5 Canvas Samples used by Mowery [3]
In 2014, Acar et al. performed an empirical study to show the percentage of
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the top 100,000 Alexa websites which use Canvas for the sake of Fingerprinting
(refer to Chapter 3.2 for more details) [4]. They found out the Canvas sample
used the most among the websites is the one in Figure 2.2. This sample contains
perfect pangram text drawn twice using two colors and a fake font name (to
include the text fallback factor). The sample also included the Unicode smiling
face character, and an orange rectangle. The research does not calculate the
entropy of the sample as their main target is to calculate the Canvas prevalence
for fingerprinting purposes.
Figure 2.2: The Canvas Sample reported by Acar [4]
The fingerprinting dataset gathered by Laperdrix et al. in 2016 via the website
AmIUnique used the same Canvas sample to fingerprint users, except that the
two texts do not overlap as in Figure 2.3 [1]. The normalized Shannon entropy
of this Canvas sample was 0.491 when calculated on the dataset of over 118,000
fingerprints (more analysis on this dataset in Section 2.3). This sample became
more commonly used than the samples used by Mowery (Figure 2.2) as their
complexity produces more entropy, which increases the distinguishing capability.
Figure 2.3: The Canvas Sample used by Laperdrix in AmIUnique [1]
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The most recent large scale fingerprinting study performed in 2018 by Gomez-
Boix et al. using one of the top French websites was able to gather fingerprints
from over two million user visits [5]. Gomez-Boix et al. used the Canvas sample
in Figure 2.4, which is the most complex Canvas sample we have seen in a large
scale fingerprinting research. Although the sample is more complex than the one
in Figure 2.3, it produced an entropy of 0.407, which is less than the entropy
produced by the less complex sample. This can be explained by several reasons:
the differences between the percentages of Operating Systems and browsers in-
cluded in each of the studies (which is what we refer to as the market share bias
in Table 2.2), or the changes in web trends over time affecting the entropy of a
fingerprinting techniques. Here arises the importance of performing the distin-
guishing capability analysis on the same dataset of web users using many Canvas
samples, to understand the impact of introducing more complexity while fixing
all the other variables, as we do in Chapter 4.
Figure 2.4: The Canvas Sample used by Gomez-Boix [5]
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2.3 Significant Fingerprinting Datasets
Several research papers studied the effectiveness of fingerprinting, and the extent
to which it can be used to uniquely identify web users. For benchmarking, we chose
three large scale datasets to compare our findings to. These datasets span over 8
years since the discovery of fingerprinting, to also have an idea of any trends occur
in the distinguishing capability of the various fingerprints. In 2010, Eckersley
performed the first large scale study of device fingerprinting, using the website
Panopticlick [36]. The number of fingerprinting samples gathered by the website
were initially 1,043,426, and reduced to 470,161 fingerprints by several stages of
preprocessing and filtering, to remove some records affected by a client side bug,
and to eliminate any bias [21]. In his research, Eckersley was able to show the
large diversity of devices over the web, and that by collecting device and browser
specific information such as HTTP headers, list of plug-ins and attributes gathered
by JavaScript, it was possible to uniquely identify over 94% of the browsers at
the time of performing the research according to his gathered samples. It is
noteworthy that the data gathered by this website is biased, as the visitors are
mostly technical people who are privacy aware.
In 2016, Laperdrix et al. performed another large scale experiment to study
the effectiveness of web fingerprinting, how the user uniqueness has changed from
2010, and how the fingerprinting techniques have developed [1]. This was the first
extensive experiment that studies fingerprinting on mobile devices in addition to
desktops. They built the website AmIUnique [37], using which they gathered
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fingerprints from over 118,000 user visits, each of them were fingerprinted using
17 attributes. Unlike Eckersley (2010) [21], Laperdrix et al. included Canvas
as a fingerprinting attribute in their research, since Canvas fingerprint was only
discovered by Mowery et al. in 2012 [3]. Laperdrix et al. reported that 89.4%
of the clients visiting the AmIUnique website are unique. They analyzed the
differences in the distinguishing capability of the various fingerprinting attributes
over time. Some major findings are the significant and continuous reduction in
the browser plugins, and showing that Canvas is one of the most discriminating
attributes. They performed a simulation that estimates the impact of the removal
of plugins and the usage of generic HTTP headers to reduce the uniqueness of
desktop fingerprints by 36%. Table 4.8 compares the normalized entropy for some
of attributes that vary significantly between desktop and mobile devices, according
to their dataset. One of the downsides of this research is the bias towards the
privacy aware community, who tend to visit the website more than the average
users of the web. Table 2.2 presents the bias in the AmIUnique dataset and in our
dataset (as analyzed later in Chapter 4.3) in terms of the proportion of operating
systems in the web against the actual, as reported by StatCounter in October
2018 [38]. It is noteworthy that the bias in our dataset is less than the dataset
obtained from the Website AmIUnique, as all our percentages are the closer to
the actual OS market share.
Gomez-Boix et al. (2018) targeted to overcome this bias of privacy aware web-
site visitors by collecting and analyzing over 2 million fingerprints gathered from
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Table 2.2: Bias in the Various Datasets in the proportion of Operating Systems
Against the Actual
OS Type AmIUnique [1] French Website [5] Our Dataset Actual [38]
Windows 57% 82% 56% 36%
Linux 15% <1% 1% <1%
Mac 13% 5% 8% 6%
Android 5% 9% 19% 40%
iOS 4% 2% 15% 13%
one of the top 15 French site to target broader audience [5]. A noteworthy finding
is that the percentage of unique fingerprints has reduced to 33.6% from 89.4%
in 2016, showing a significant reduction in the ability to distinguish web users
in about 2 year time span. Gomez-Boix et al. explained that this drop in the
distinguishing capability was due to the less biased dataset towards privacy aware
people, as well as the reduction of plugins in desktops, showing that the changes
happening to web technologies nowadays improve user privacy. Gomez-Boix et al.
shows the the fingerprinting attribute that is the most capable of distinguishing
mobile devices is Canvas, while it is the list of plugins in desktops. They also
showed experimentally that the non-unique fingerprints in desktops are signifi-
cantly more fragile than mobile devices, meaning that if a browser fingerprint is
not unique, it is more probable to become unique by changing a fingerprinting
attribute in desktops than in mobile devices. Table 2.2 also lists the operating
system proportions in the dataset of [5], and how it compares to our dataset and
the actual operating system market share, presenting less bias than the AmIU-
nique dataset [1]. Finally, Table 2.3 summarizes the Shannon normalized entropy
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reported of the various fingerprinting attributes as reported by the tree bench-
marking datasets, which our research refers to in the upcoming chapters.
Table 2.3: Shannon Normalized Entropy of the Three Major Fingerprinting
Datasets in Literature
Fingerprinting Attribute Panopticlick AmIUnique Hiding In The
(2010) [21] (2016) [1] Crowd (2018) [5]
Platform - 0.137 0.057
Do Not Track - 0.056 0.091
Timezone 0.161 0.198 0.008
List of plugins 0.817 0.656 0.452
Use of local/session storage - 0.024 0.002
Use of an ad blocker - 0.059 0.002
WebGL Vendor - 0.127 0.109
WebGL Renderer - 0.202 0.264
Available fonts 0.738 0.497 0.329
Canvas - 0.491 0.407
Header Accept - 0.082 0.035
Content encoding - 0.091 0.018
Content language - 0.351 0.129
User-agent 0.531 0.580 0.341
Screen resolution 0.256 0.290 0.231
List of HTTP headers - 0.249 0.085





This chapter consists of two major sections. The first section gives an overview
about Canvas starting from its history and support. It describes the various
functionality Canvas was introduced for, showing why it is a serious candidate
to replace Flash with real life examples. It also demonstrates how JavaScript is
used to manipulate Canvas and shows the corresponding output. Finally, it shows
what API methods are being utilized for the tracking purposes, which is the main
basis for the following chapters. The second section of this chapter includes an
empirical study to understand the extent to which Canvas is prevalent in the web
for both the legitimate and tracking purposes, in order to understand the cost of
disabling Canvas to protect users’ privacy. This is to complement the literature
which only focuses on the Canvas prevalence for tracking. The second section
starts by defining the approach and experimental setup, reporting initial results,
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revising the approach and reporting the final findings.
3.1 Canvas Feature Background
Canvas was introduced with HTML5, and it is one of the most powerful features
of it. Canvas works as a placeholder on which shapes, images and text can be
drawn on the fly. There is Canvas specific API that can be used for many pur-
poses including drawing shapes like lines, curves, circles, rectangles and fill them
with colors, gradients or patterns. Drawing and manipulating text, changing
the font properties and position, manipulating images, processing videos, mak-
ing smooth animations and developing games are all possible using the Canvas
powerful API [6]. Geary has used Canvas to implement several applications that
can be otherwise implemented using Flash. For example, the image panning
application in Fig. 3.1, a paint application that runs on browsers and iPads,
as well as animations and games [6]. We observed several scientific web ap-
plications using Canvas to build animated solar system model, for example, to
teach kids, while other websites implemented user interactive 3D application that
shows how chemical atoms are bound to construct molecules. Countless web-
sites built games with complex physics, while others included animated analog
clocks built by Canvas. With the expected death of Flash in 2020 [39], Canvas
seems to be a strong possible replacement for many of its capabilities including
drawing, animations, and interactivity. We see popular websites shifting from
Flash to Canvas such as http://www.speedtest.net which utilizes Canvas in
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its new Flash-free version and moved the original Flash version of the website to
http://legacy.speedtest.net/. Fig. 3.2 shows how the Canvas version looks
in the Flash-free SpeedTest. Canvas is supported in most of the major browsers
nowadays. The support has started from version 4.0 of Google Chrome, version
9.0 of Internet Explorer, version 2.0 of Mozilla Firefox, version 3.1 of Safari and
version 9.0 of Opera [40].
Figure 3.1: Image Panning Implemented Using Canvas API [6]
3.1.1 Concrete Canvas Example
Canvas is an HTML container for a Context, which is used to draw graphics.
This is done by retrieving the HTML tag <canvas> using the JavaScript method
document.getElementById(), then getting the Canvas context by the method
getContext(‘2d’), and using the context to draw content to the Canvas. After
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Figure 3.2: Flash-free Version of speedtest.net
getting the context of the Canvas, JavaScript is used to set the values of the
attributes such as the font color attribute of the drawn text (fillStyle) and the size
and type attribute of the font (font), and so on [6]. Listing 3.1 shows an example
on how to get a Canvas element, retrieve the context, change the attributes and
finally draw shapes and text. The output of the example is displayed as in Fig.
3.3.
The attributes of the Canvas context such as the text font, fill style and shadow
can be updated dynamically upon the user’s interaction with the website. In
addition to that, the attributes can be saved and restored any time by JavaScript
methods if there is a need to temporarily change the attribute values. Canvas
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Listing 3.1: Example of an HTML Canvas Element Retrieved and Manipulated
Using JavaScript




4 <script type= 'text/javascript '>
5
6 var canvas = document.getElementById('canvas '); //
Creating the Canvas Variable
7 var context = canvas.getContext('2d'); // Retrieving the
Canvas Context
8
9 context.font = '38pt Times New Roman '; // Changing the
font type and size
10 context.fillStyle = 'brown '; // Changing the fill color
to brown
11 context.strokeStyle = 'Green '; // Changing the stroke
color to brown
12
13 context.fillText('Canvas Example ', 60 ,60); // Filling
Text
14 context.strokeText('Canvas Example ', 60,60); // Stroking
Text
15
16 context.lineJoin = 'round '; // Making the stroked
rectangle with rounded edges
17 context.lineWidth = 30; // Changing the width of the
stroked rectangle
18 context.strokeStyle = 'cornflowerblue '; // Choosing
stroke color
19 context.strokeRect (85 /*x*/, 100 /*y*/, 140 /*width */,
180 /* height */); // Stroking a rectangle
20
21 context.fillStyle = 'burlywood '; // Choosing fill color




applications can be built to detect user interactions such as mouse and keyboard
events and respond accordingly. For example, event listeners can be added for
actions like onmousedown, onmouseup, onmouseout and onmousemove to
29
Figure 3.3: Output of The Canvas Manipulation
handle mouse events, as well as keydown, keypress and keyup for keyboard
events. Canvas has a coordinate system with the origin at the upper left corner.
The X-axis increases to the right and the Y-axis increases to the bottom.
3.1.2 Attack Surface
Canvas is a bitmap, not an image HTML element. So, if the web developer would
like to give access to users to retrieve or download the Canvas as an image, a
method named toDataURL() can be used to get a Data URL and assign it
to an image HTML element in the src attribute. This enables the user of an
online paint application built by Canvas, for example, to download a snapshot of
the drawing they made. Another method named toBlob() allows to store the
Canvas in a file. These two JavaScript methods make it possible to return the
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Canvas data as it was rendered on the client machines’ web browsers. However,
these methods are found to be implemented and used by many web applications
to substitute the common techniques of tracking users such as cookies [4] [1] [3]
[23]. The applications proposed and implemented in this research also use one of
these methods (i.e. toDataURL()) to retrieve the Canvas data and use it as a
fingerprint for detecting attacks like session hijacking and fake accounts creation
on web applications, as well as in attacking users’ privacy.
3.2 Canvas Prevalence
In order to establish a common understanding of how important and widely used
Canvas is, we defined a different target and approach to those research experiments
previously published and pointed out in Chapter 2.2.1. Our target is to find out
the number and percentage of websites using Canvas, both for legitimate purposes
which the Canvas feature was initially meant for, or for defeating users’ privacy.
Either of these ways of using Canvas is convincing for us to continue our research
in Canvas, given that the more Canvas is used legitimately, the more difficult it
is for users to block the Canvas feature on the browser level, as this will result on
functionality failure of a significant number of websites. Also, the more Canvas is
being used to track users, the more researchers need to find solutions to protect
users’ privacy. So we decided to look for the percentage of top Alexa websites
that use Canvas for all purposes, both for legitimate and user tracking purposes,
and rely on the results published in [32] to estimate the percentage of which that
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are using Canvas for legitimate purposes.
3.2.1 Experimental Setup
In our initial definition, we considered a website to be using Canvas if we find
the HTML element <canvas> in the main HTML source code of the web-
site. To know the Canvas prevalence, we developed a script that scrapes the
top 100,000 Alexa websites looking for the ones that contain the <canvas>
in the HTML. The script is written in Python and uses Selenium web driver
(http://www.seleniumhq.org/). Selenium is a tool that runs and drives a
web browser application, like Mozilla Firefox in our case, through a programming
interface, and is designed for testing web applications. Choosing Selenium was to
mimic real browser’s behavior, and to overcome anti scrapping techniques that are
implemented in some websites where other libraries fail to circumvent, as well as
Selenium helped in avoiding decoding errors we faced when trying other libraries.
Once a website is visited by the web browser, the source HTML is passed to Beau-
tiful Soup. Beautiful Soup is a Python Library that provides methods to enable
parsing, searching and navigation through a document to extract the needed in-
formation from it (https://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/).
Our script used Beautiful Soup to look for the <canvas> HTML element, and if
found, it marks the website as a website that uses Canvas. Algorithm 1 is explains
the logic of our initial scrapping script.
We ran our Scrapping script between 27-December-2017 and 3-January-2018
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Algorithm 1 Initial Scrapping Algorithm for Canvas Usage
Input: list of n websites to be scrapped on the current server (i.e. subset of
the top 100,000 Alexa sites)
Output: Percentage of websites containing <canvas> in HTML source
1: Each server concurrently executes the following code for its corresponding list
of websites:
2: Read a CSV file and construct a list of n websites to be run on the current
server
3: x← 0 {i.e. number of websites containing Canvas}
4: y ← 0 {i.e. number of websites failed in reading}
5: z ← 0 {i.e. number of websites successfully read}
6: for i← 0, i < n, i← i + 1 do
7: Initialize a selenium webdriver instance
8: Set the page load timeout value to 60 seconds
9: Pass the URL to the browser through the webdriver
10: Get HTML source from the browser
11: if website loading time passes page load timeout then
12: y ← y + 1
13: Continue to the next for loop iteration
14: else
15: z ← z + 1
16: end if
17: Pass HTML source to BeautifulSoup parser
18: Search for “<canvas>” in HTML
19: if “<canvas>” is found then
20: x← x + 1
21: end if
22: end for
23: return x, y, z, x/z {i.e. percentage of websites containing <canvas> in HTML
source}
on 10 Google Cloud servers in parallel, each server visiting 10,000 websites from
the list of the top 100,000 Alexa sites. Each of the servers ran Windows Server
2016 as the operating system, on a dual core Intel Xeon CPU with a speed of 2.30
GHz and a RAM size between 7.5 and 10 Gigabytes. The Internet connectivity
is stable on the Google Cloud servers, with more than 270 Mbps of download
speed and over 85 Mbps of upload speed. The reasons why we decided to run the
script on Google Cloud servers are the easiness in selecting the exact hardware
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specifications that we need and pay for them only during the execution of the
script, the Internet connectivity stability, the ability to execute the scripts in
parallel to reduce the execution duration, and to reduce the number of blocked
sites by the local ISP, since the cloud servers used were in the United States,
where less sites may be blocked.
3.2.2 Initial Results
The results of running the scrapping script showed that 9.34% of the top 500
websites had the <canvas> element in their main website page. This percentage
kept decreasing to be 5.37% for the top 1000 websites, 2.83% for the top 10,000
and 2.45% for the top 100,000 websites. Table 3.2 shows the number of websites
attempted to be visited by the script, the number of websites successfully read, the
number of websites failed in reading, the number of websites using the <canvas>
element, and the percentage of websites using the <canvas> element from the
successfully read websites. It is noteworthy that around 10% of the website were
not successfully read because of reachability problems or due to the 60 seconds
explicit timeout that we set for reading a website. Table 3.1 points out the per-
centage of websites containing Canvas elements among the top 500, 1000, 10,000
and 100,000 websites.
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Table 3.2: Portion of the top 100K Websites that Contain <canvas> Element in the HTML by 10K intervals
Alexa Sites’ Range [1-10K] (10K-20K] (20K-30K] (30K-40K] (40K-50K] (50K-60K] (60K-70K] (70K-80K] (80K-90K] (90K-100K] Total
Successfully Read 9,182 9,030 9,020 8,901 8,915 8,950 8,933 8,989 8,950 9,017 89,887
Reading Failed 818 970 980 1,099 1,085 1,050 1,067 1,011 1,050 983 10,113
Contains Canvas 260 226 220 193 218 215 232 210 211 220 2,205
Canvas Prevalence % 2.83% 2.50% 2.44% 2.17% 2.45% 2.40% 2.60% 2.34% 2.36% 2.44% 2.45%
Table 3.3: Portion of the top 100K Websites that Use Canvas by 10K Intervals According to the Revised Definition
Alexa Sites’ Range [1-10K] (10K-20K] (20K-30K] (30K-40K] (40K-50K] (50K-60K] (60K-70K] (70K-80K] (80K-90K] (90K-100K] Total
Successfully Read 9,182 9,088 9,018 8,922 8,894 8,932 8,971 8,995 8,993 9,002 89,997
Reading Failed 818 912 982 1,078 1,106 1,068 1,029 1,005 1,007 998 10,003
Contains Canvas 2,016 2,116 2,030 2,029 2,151 2,174 2,320 2,238 2,266 2,297 21,637
Canvas Prevalence % 21.96% 23.28% 22.51% 22.74% 24.18% 24.34% 25.86% 24.88% 25.20% 25.52% 24.04%
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3.2.3 Revised Definition and Findings
After investigations, we realized that many websites that use Canvas do not nec-
essarily contain the <canvas> element in the main HTML source, but rather
in the iframes loaded with the website. Some websites even do not even
contain a <canvas> element, as they use the JavaScript method createEle-
ment(“canvas”) to create the Canvas in a <script> element or in an imported
JavaScript file. Thus, we revised the initial definition and correspondingly the
script to consider a website to be using Canvas if:
• A Canvas element is found in the source HTML or any associated iframe.
• The method createElement(“canvas”) or createElement(‘canvas’) is
found in any <script> element the source HTML or any associated iframe.
• The method createElement(“canvas”) or createElement(‘canvas’) is
found in any imported JavaScript file whether from the main source HTML
or any associated iframe.
We realize that the script detection can be circumvented by passing a string
variable instead of “canvas” in the argument of the method, but this is a limitation
that can be accepted. Algorithm 2 shows how the logic of our revised scrapping
script looks like.
We ran our revised scrapping script between 12-January-2018 and 16-January-
2018 on the same 10 Google Cloud servers. The results showed that an average
of 24.04% of the top 100,000 websites use Canvas. Table 3.3 shows the number
37
of websites attempted to be visited by the script, the number of websites suc-
cessfully read, the number of websites failed in reading, the number of websites
using Canvas according to the revised definition, and their percentage from the
successfully read websites. Again, around 10% of the website were not successfully
read because of reachability problems or due to the 60 seconds explicit timeout
that we set for reading a website. Table 3.4 points out the percentage of websites
containing Canvas according to the revised definition among the top 500, 1000,
10,000 and 100,000 websites. Table 3.5 presents our findings in conjunction with
[32] to get an estimation of the Canvas prevalence by type of usage, showing that
over 50% of the websites we crawled and reported to be using Canvas are using it
for legitimate purposes. Since this calculation is a direct subtraction, it considers
a website that uses Canvas for both legitimate and tracking purposes only in the
tracking side, which is a safe assumption that may only reduce the prevalence for
legitimate usage. Besides being the first reported Canvas prevalence statistic for
legitimate purposes that is reported in the literature, the percentages reported
in Table 3.5 help quantify the potential high cost of completely blocking Canvas.
This may occur if users decide to use browser plugins to block Canvas from ap-
pearing in the loaded web pages, or if web browsers decide to disable Canvas for
the sake of protecting user’s privacy. In either cases, web users will face partial
or complete functionality failures when visiting 24% of all the web applications,
out of which over 50% are solely using Canvas for legitimate purposes, according
to our estimation. Therefore, users will not continue to have seamless experi-
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Table 3.4: Usage of Canvas According to the Revised Definition by top 500, 1K,





ence when visiting a huge amount of websites (1 out of 4), leading to the need of
rebuilding new versions of the same websites that are Canvas-free.
Table 3.5: Estimated Canvas Prevalence by Type of Usage
Author Year Websites Crawling Prevalence (top
Published Date 10K Websites)
Our Research
(Overall Canvas Usage) 2018 January 2018 21.96%
Le et al. [32]
(for tracking purposes) 2017 April 2016 10.44%
Our Research
(for legitimate purposes) 2018 - 11.52%
It is noteworthy that several websites do not fingerprint the user on the landing
page, so they were not detected or included in our calculations by definition.
An example of these websites is https://amiunique.org/ which was initially built
by Laperdrix et al. to carry out their research on fingerprinting techniques [1].
Another observation is that many websites like Google and its variants use Canvas
in some days but not in others. Since our reported results were based on the
empirical study we carried out in conjunction with another research findings [32], it
is important take into consideration the following dependencies: there is a duration
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of 21 months separating the execution of our crawling script and the crawling done
in [32], which may cause some impact in the web trends that affect our reported
percentage of Canvas prevalence for legitimate purposes. Moreover, calculating
the Canvas prevalence for legitimate purposes was through a direct subtraction
of the overall usage minus tracking usage, which introduced a limitation when a
website uses Canvas for both legitimate and tracking purposes, as it has been only
considered in the tracking side.
3.2.4 Algorithms Explanation
Algorithm 1 aims to visit each of the top 100,000 Alexa websites searching for the
HTML element <Canvas> in the source code, and and outputs the percentage of
websites that include the element in the main HTML page. It takes as an input
a CSV file with the list of websites. The algorithm starts by distributing the
list of websites to be visited among the servers available, and each participating
server reads the corresponding list from the CSV file. Afterwards, the script starts
three counter on each server and initializes the counter to 0. The counters are
x (the number of websites containing <Canvas> in the HTML source code), y
(the number of websites failed in reading, so they do not contribute positively or
negatively in the percentage of Canvas prevalence) and z (the number of websites
successfully read by the server). The percentage of Canvas prevalence will be
calculated later by dividing x/z.
The main body of Algorithm 1 (i.e. lines 6-22) consists of a loop and two if
40
statements, where each loop is for a single website visit. every iteration of the
loop initializes a Selenium webdriver instance and passes a website’s URL to it
in order to mimics a user visit to the website. The instance is set to time out if
the website does not load within 60 seconds, increments the y counter (websites
failed in reading), and continues to the next loop iteration. Otherwise if the
website is read successfully the z counter increments (successfully read websites’
counter) and the website HTML source is passed to the BeautifulSoup parser,
which in turn searches for the HTML element <canvas>. If found, the x counter
increments. Once the loop passes over all the websites a server is assigned to visit,
the algorithm returns the values of the three counters x, y and z, as well as the
percentage of websites containing <canvas> (i.e. x/z).
Algorithm 2 shares the same input, initial steps and counters as Algorithm 1.
The differences are in the Output and the main body of the loop. The output of
Algorithm 2 is the percentage of websites using Canvas in the HTML or JavaScript,
in all the frames loaded with the home web page of the website. For every iteration
of the main loop body (i.e. lines 6-35), a Selenium webdriver instance is initialized
with a website’s URL. If the website times out, the y counter in cements (failed
websites), and continues to the next loop iteration. Otherwise if the website is read
successfully the z counter increments (successfully read) and a list of the loaded
frames is constructed. Another internal loop iterates over the list of loaded frames
with the website, retrieving all the JavaScript loaded (whether in loaded files or
inside <script> tags). If any of the HTML pages in any of the frames include
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a Canvas tag, or any of the JavaScript components use the method to create a
Canvas element, the x counter increments. Once the outermost loop passes over
all the websites a server is meant to visit, the algorithm returns the values x, y,
z, and x/z.
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we shed the light over the HTML5 Canvas element, the feature
used for developing interactive content on web applications. The wide support of
Canvas among browsers, the examples given of applications developed using Can-
vas, and the websites switching their content to newer Canvas versions from what
previously was developed in Flash are all facts that make it possible to observe
the trend of the increasing adoption of Canvas. This chapter also gives a concrete
example of how to retrieve a Canvas element using JavaScript, manipulate it by
drawing content, then shows the actual output of how it looks after rendering
on the web page. Afterwards, it was pointed out which API function can be
used to fingerprint users, enabling the constructive and destructive applications
we propose and validate in Chapters 5 and 6.
The literature studied the prevalence of Canvas fingerprinting, and reported
the significant increase overtime since the discovery of Canvas as a fingerprinting
mechanism in 2012 [3]. A recent study published in 2017 reported the over 10% of
the top 10,000 Alexa websites use Canvas for fingerprinting. To complement the
reported findings, we studied the Canvas prevalence for all purposes, to help realize
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the cost of disabling Canvas entirely if someone wishes to protect themselves
from being tracked. To do this, we developed and ran the scrapping algorithms
explained in this chapter on 10 rented servers which visited 100,000 websites to
find out that about 1 out of 4 websites use Canvas, out of which 11.52% use
Canvas for legitimate purposes.
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Algorithm 2 Revised Scrapping Algorithm for Canvas Usage
Input: list of n websites to be scrapped on the current server (i.e. subset of
the top 100,000 Alexa sites)
Output: Percentage of websites using Canvas in HTML or JavaScript,
whether in the main frame or any iframe
1: Each server concurrently executes the following code for its corresponding list
of websites:
2: Read a CSV file and construct a list of n websites to be run on the current
server
3: x← 0 {i.e. number of websites containing Canvas}
4: y ← 0 {i.e. number of websites failed in reading}
5: z ← 0 {i.e. number of websites successfully read}
6: for i← 0, i < n, i← i + 1 do
7: Initialize a selenium webdriver instance
8: Set the page load timeout value to 60 seconds
9: Pass the URL to the browser through the webdriver
10: Construct a list F of all iframes loaded including the default frame
11: if website loading time passes page load timeout then
12: y ← y + 1
13: Continue to the next for loop iteration
14: else
15: z ← z + 1
16: end if
17: for each f ∈ F do
18: Retrieve HTML source loaded in frame f
19: Retrieve and construct a list S of all JavaScript tags’ and files’ content
loaded in frame f
20: Pass HTML source and list S of frame f to BeautifulSoup parser
21: Search for “<canvas>” in HTML
22: if “<canvas>” is found then
23: x← x + 1
24: Continue to the next outermost for loop iteration
25: else
26: for each s ∈ S do
27: Search for “createElement(“canvas”)” in s
28: if “createElement(“canvas”)” is found then
29: x← x + 1












In Section 2.2.2 of the Literature Review, we observed a trend in the Canvas
samples used for fingerprinting, which is the increased complexity over time. Ob-
serving this trend helps realizing that Canvas is one of the tracking techniques
that has high potential to enhance. Moreover, there are many pros of Canvas like
the consistency in the fingerprint value coming from the same device and browser,
the high entropy, the transparency to web users, and not requiring permission to
obtain [3]. All of these reasons are the basis of dedicating this chapter to study
the distinguishing capability of different Canvas samples. To achieve that, we
designed and carried out an empirical study with the following targets: drafting
guidelines on how to enhance the Canvas samples used to fingerprint users, pro-
viding strong Canvas samples in terms of distinguishing users, and comparing the
Canvas samples to other widely used fingerprinting techniques.
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4.1 Experimental Setup
To achieve our targets, we built a website and hosted it publicly. The website
asks the visitors to fill out a form with the specifications of the device and browser
from which they are currently browsing. The website asks the user to select the
category of the device she is using, then shows different forms and instructions for
the different types of devices. For example, the iPhone and iPad specific form does
not ask the user to provide the Graphics Card Type and Version or the RAM size
because it is less intuitive to the user to obtain such pieces of information, and we
can obtain these details by the device model information the user provides. Also,
the user instructions on how to obtain the specifications information are platform
specific. On each of the form fields, we provided a link that opens the steps on a
new browser tab. Fig. 4.1 shows the landing page of the website.
Figure 4.1: Landing Page of the Data Gathering Website
The specifications we asked for included the browsers type and version, operat-
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ing systems type and version, device model, whether the browser used is installed
in a virtual environment, Graphics Card Type and Version, Graphics Card Mem-
ory, RAM Size, CPU Type and number of cores. The step-by-step instructions
provided to the visitors explained how to gather these details from the operat-
ing systems: Windows, Linux, MacOS, iOS and Android, and from the browsers:
Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer and Opera.
Once the user submits the devices specifications, the website retrieves many
other Canvas and non-Canvas fingerprints along with the user provided details.
This allows for correlating the device specifications to the fingerprints retrieved.
The non-Canvas fingerprints gathered are listed in Table 4.1 with corresponding
values gathered from a Chrome browser on a laptop running Windows 10 as
examples of what the fingerprints could look like. The reason why we gathered
the non-Canvas fingerprints is to see how our dataset compares to the datasets
other research on fingerprinting previously used, such as Laperdrix et al. [1]
and Eckersley [21] in terms of entropy, especially for the fingerprints with high
entropy like the list of fonts, plugins, and user agent. In addition, gathering non-
Canvas fingerprints allows us to compare our top Canvas fingerprints to other
that are being used currently in the wild, and to set a benchmark that we try
to reach by our enhanced Canvas fingerprints. These fingerprints became handy
during the data filtering and helped us being confident that a certain person has
submitted the online form more than once. The fingerprinting code that gathered
the fingerprints in Table 4.1 was originally developed by Valentin Vasilyev and
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updated by Dave Alger, who has published the source code with a free license to
use (https://codepen.io/run-time/pen/XJNXWV).
We also designed 23 Canvas samples and gathered them to fingerprint users.
While designing the samples, we took into account making them diverse. We
did this by adding various components to the different samples like text, emojis,
shapes, backgrounds, pictures. Even for those samples with similar components,
we changed other characteristics such as the number of characters and emojis,
types of fonts, colors, adding shadows. For several Canvas samples, we also com-
bined several components in a single Canvas. Table 4.2 summarizes the characters
of each of the 23 Canvas samples we gathered, and Appendix A includes the ac-
tual rendered samples along with statistics on how many unique samples, distinct
samples, and how many characters there are in the Data URL version of each
sample.
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Table 4.1: The Samples of the Non-Canvas Fingerprints We Gathered
Fingerprint Description Example Shannon Normalized
Entropy Entropy
Browser Represents the browser name and ma-
jor version
Chrome 64 2.743 0.304
Flash A string that includes the Flash Player
version
N/A 0 0
Canvas A string in Base 64 representing
how pixels are rendered on a de-





Connection Specifies if the connection is wifi,
celullar or undefined
Undefined 1.442 0.160
Cookie A boolean that indicates whether cook-
ies are enabled
True 0.020 0.002
Display Actual & available width & height, and
color depth
24—1366—768—1366—728 5.271 0.584
Font Smoothing A boolean that indicates if font
smoothing is enabled. Smoothing aims
to avoid pixelation across resolutions
True 0.839 0.100
Fonts Includes the list of fonts detected at the
client browser






Form Fields Returns all form fields a user can input
data into, to detect if certain clients try






Java A boolean that indicates whether Java
is enabled
False 0.309 0.034
Language The current browser, user and system
language settings
lang=en-US—syslang=—userlang= 1.101 0.122
Silverlight A string that includes the Silverlight
version
N/A 0.135 0.0150
Operating System The operating system on which the
browser is running
Windows NT 4.0—32 bits 3.020 0.334
Time Zone A number that represents the relative
time of a client
3 2.761 0.306
Touch A boolean that indicates whether touch
is enabled
False 0.802 0.0888
True Browser Looks specifically for the real applica-
tion name
Safari 0.648 0.072
Plugins Includes the list of plugins detected at
the client browser




User Agent An HTTP header string that is passed
from a client to the web server to tailor
responses according to the capabilities
of a client





Comprehensive Hash of the combination of all at-
tributes in this table
2876715415 8.490 0.940
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Has text X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Has Emoji X X X X
Has all alphabetical letters X X X X X X X X X X X X
Has more than 20 emojis X X X
Several fonts X X
Has Shapes X X X X X X X X X X
Has several shapes X X X X X X X X
Has Shadows X X X
Text/Shapes in diff. colors X X X X X X X X X
Has Gradient X X X X X X X X
Contains picture X
Background entirely Covered X X X X X



















































































Table 4.2: Characteristics of the Canvas Samples Gathered
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4.2 Dataset
The website containing the online form was distributed publicly to our acquain-
tances, the academic community, and social networks. In addition, we posted
a task to fill out the online form on Mechanical Turk [41]. Mechanical Turk is
a marketplace for human intelligence where on-demand workforce is available to
complete tasks that cannot otherwise be automated. The task we posted forwards
the people who accept the task to our website to fill out the online form with the
details of the device and browser from which they are browsing. Once they fill
out the form, our website gives them a unique random number to enter in the
Mechanical Turk website as a confirmation that they completed the task, and
they get paid accordingly. People were asked to only provide one submission from
the same device, so that the number of distinct values is not impacted by similar
fingerprints submitted from the same device.
We reviewed and analyzed the data submitted by users on our website to
remove duplicates and incorrect input. Several factors helped us in determining
whether certain submissions are duplicated. The indications we looked at are that
the user provided details are exactly same, the user writing style and submission
timeframe are very close, all or most Canvas and non-Canvas fingerprints are the
same, the submission is done from the same IP address. We eliminated all the
submissions where the input was determined to be duplicated submissions from
the same devices. Afterwards, we reviewed the submissions looking for inaccurate
data input. A third review of the data was done to ensure the entered data is
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consistent and spelled correctly in order to be able to filter the data by specific
fields. Some submissions included data that appears to be accurate, but not all
the fields were filled. We accepted some of these submissions and included them
in the entropy calculations, but did not use them in any specific analysis that
required the missing information. After the data filtering took place, the number
of submission that were considered in the study has decreased from 701 to 524
submissions.
4.3 Analysis
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the number of users’ submissions per operating system
and browser respectively. several of the submissions were missing those details,
and hence, the number of samples does not sum up to 524. It is interesting to
note that the devices running the different versions of Windows constructed 56%
of the dataset, and the submissions done from the Chrome browser were 70% of
the dataset.
The bar chart in Fig. 4.2 shows the total number of user submissions in the
leftmost bar, which is the maximum number of distinct values a fingerprint can
achieve. The higher number of distinct values a Canvas sample (or any fingerprint)
has, the better it is in fingerprinting and in distinguishing different devices. Fig.
4.2 also shows the ability of each Canvas sample in Appendix A to distinguish users
into different groups via fingerprinting. The two rightmost bars in the bar chart
represent the number of distinct values retrieved by the Canvas sample commonly
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Table 4.3: Number and Percentage of Submissions per Operating System
Operating System Number of Samples Percentage
Windows 10 145 28.9%
Windows 7 99 19.8%
Android (several versions) 95 19.0%
iOS (several versions) 76 15.2%
MacOS (several versions) 41 8.2%
Windows 8 31 6.2%
Linux (several distributions) 6 1.2%
Windows XP 4 0.8%
Windows Vista 3 0.6%
ChromeOS 1 0.2%
Table 4.4: Number and Percentage of Submissions per Browser




Internet Explorer 13 2.5%
Opera 10 1.9%
Edge 6 1.2%
UC browser 5 1.0%
Dolphin 3 0.6%
used in the wild, which is also used as part of the multi-attribute fingerprinting
algorithm in Table 4.1, as well as the number of the distinct values retrieved by
the comprehensive multi-attribute fingerprinting algorithm.
Canvas samples 19, 20 and 23 seem to be the best three samples in distinguish-
ing devices. Although 19 is able to distribute devices into the highest number of
groups (i.e. 317) based on the Canvas fingerprint, we do not recommend using it
because this sample is not very persistent. When we loaded the website on the
same browser using the same device, we got more than one fingerprint value at
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different times. When investigated further, we found out that Google fonts are
not always loading correctly although the same setting was in place. Canvases
20 and 23 are among the most powerful in distinguishing devices. Our preference
is Canvas 20, since it does not require loading a picture from the Internet like
Canvas 23 does, and therefore requires less downloading time.
Figure 4.2: Number of Distinct Canvas Values per Sample
As in the major fingerprinting research papers, we use Shannon entropy to
indicate the amount of information a fingerprint gives. The fingerprint is better
and more identifying when the entropy is higher. We calculated the Shannon’s




P (xi) log2 P (xi)
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Where P (xi) is the probability of the value xi occurring according to our
dataset, and n is the total number of distinct fingerprint values in the dataset.
The probability is calculated for a fingerprint value xi by dividing the number of
times the same value of the fingerprint appeared by the total number of values
(i.e. valid user submissions) in the dataset.
In order to eliminate the factor of the dataset size, and to compare our obtained
fingerprints with other datasets like AmIUnique and Panopticlick, we calculated
the Normalized Shannon’s Entropy by dividing the entropy obtained using the
previous equation by the maximum possible entropy log2(N) where all devices’
fingerprints are unique (N represents the entire size of the dataset). The Normal-
ized Shannon Entropy results always in a value between 0 and 1. Practically on
large datasets, it is very unlikely to see any fingerprinting technique with Normal-
ized Shannon Entropy reaching 1, which indicates that the technique is ideal in
fingerprinting web users. However, reaching the maximum normalized entropy is
theoretically possible if and only if all the values appearing in the dataset being
analyzed are unique. Even if a dataset includes distinct values that appear exactly
the same number of times each, this condition does not apply and the Shannon
entropy would be less than 1. For illustration, let D1 and D2 be 2 datasets
of size 8 where D1 = {v1, v2, v3, ..., v8}, and v1 6= v2 6= v3 6= ... 6= v8. While
D2 = {v1, v1, v2, v2, v3, v3, v4, v4}, and v1 6= v2 6= v3 6= v4. We demonstrate below
how D1 (which contain values that are all unique) result in Normalized Shannon
Entropy that equals 1 and how D2 (which contain distinct values repeated the
55
same number of times) result in Normalized Shannon Entropy that is less than 1:
Shannon entropy of D1 = −
∑8
i=1 P (vi) log2 P (vi) = −8[P (vi) log2 P (vi)]
= −8[(0.125)(−3)] = 3
Since the maximum possible entropy of a dataset with 8 values is log2(8) = 3,
then the Normalized Shannon Entropy of dataset D1 = 1.
Similarly, Shannon entropy of D2 = −
∑4
i=1 P (vi) log2 P (vi)
= −4[P (vi) log2 P (vi)] = −4[(0.25)(−2)] = 2
Since the dataset has the same number of values, the maximum possible en-
tropy is log2(8) = 3, then the Normalized Shannon Entropy of dataset D2 =
0.667. The advantage of using the Normalized Shannon Entropy is that it is de-
pendent on the distribution of probabilities, and does not take into consideration
the dataset size, making it fair to compare distinguishing capability results of a
fingerprinting technique across datasets of different sizes. In addition, Normalized
Shannon Entropy is widespread among the other web fingerprinting research and
other well known datasets in the literature. With this, we find the Normalized
Shannon Entropy to be the most fit measurement to use. Table 4.5 compares the
normalized entropy of seven of the most common fingerprints including Canvas
on separate datasets: Panopticlick [21], AmIUnique [1], Hiding In The Crowd [5]
and our research. It also shows how our enhanced Canvas sample compares to
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the commonly used Canvas sample (as well as other non-Canvas fingerprints) in
terms of entropy.
Table 4.5: Normalized Entropy of the Major Fingerprinting Attributes on Three
Datasets
Attribute Our Research Hiding In The AmIUnique Panopticlick
(2018) Crowd (2018) (2016) (2010)
User agent 0.684 0.431 0.570 0.531
List of plugins 0.307 0.452 0.578 0.817
List of fonts 0.643 0.329 0.446 0.738
Display 0.584 0.341 0.277 0.256
Time Zone 0.306 0.008 0.201 0.161
Cookies enabled 0.002 0.000 0.042 0.019
Canvas 0.490 0.407 (Different 0.491 -
Sample)
Enhanced Canvas 0.837 - - -
(Sample no. 20)
The most significant entropy differences between our dataset and other previ-
ous research is observed in the Display and List of plugins attributes. AmIUnique
explained the drop of 0.24 in the entropy of the List of Plugins comparison to
Panopticlick to be a result of the absence of plugins in the mobile devices, espe-
cially with the increasing use of mobile devices to surf the web, as well as because
of the stopped support for the old NPAPI plugin architecture since 2015 on Google
Chrome [1]. The entropy of the list of plugins continues to drop by 0.27 compared
to AmIUnique. AmIUnique’s dataset includes 13,105 mobile devices fingerprints
out of 118,934, constituting a percentage of 11% of the overall dataset, while
34.2% of the fingerprinted devices in our dataset are mobile devices, which can
explain the drop in our List of Plugins entropy. The observed increase of 0.31
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in the entropy of the display attribute in comparison to AmIUnique can be ex-
plained by the difference in the information gathered by the different algorithms.
While AmIUnique gathers the screen’s width, height and color depth, we gather
the available width and available height in addition.
It is interesting to note that the Canvas fingerprint gives almost identical
entropy in both AmIUnique dataset and our dataset. Panopticlick’s research
occurred before Mowery et al. discovered Canvas fingerprinting in 2012, and
hence it did not include Canvas in their study. Our enhanced Canvas sample
(number 20) showed a significant increase in the entropy and the distinguishing
capability to successfully exceed all other fingerprints studied in this research,
in AmIUnique and in Panopticlick. These results give us high confidence that
Canvas samples can be enhanced to be more effective in distinguishing devices
than the other existing fingerprints.
4.4 Results and Validation
To understand the extent to which the reported entropy of our enhanced Canvas
sample is reliable, and the ability of our dataset to represent the population of
web user, we did the following:
• Compare the entropy of a Canvas sample that is common between our re-
search and another large dataset.
• Perform Cross Data Validation
58
As table 4.5 points out, Our research and the AMIUnique dataset have a
Canvas sample in common. When calculating the Shannon Entropy of this Canvas
sample according to our dataset, it was 0.490, while the calculated entropy for the
same Canvas sample is 0.491 according to AmIUnique [1]. This gives confidence
that our dataset is valid and representative of similar large datasets, and can be
used to calculate the entropy of other Canvas fingerprinting samples to determine
their distinguishing capability.
To perform the Cross data validation, we randomized the 524 fingerprints
gathered from every Canvas sample, and each visit was fingerprinted with multi-
ple Canvas and non-Canvas fingerprints. This randomization is to eliminate the
potential effect of people using similar devices at different times of the day when
visiting our website (e.g. people tend to use mobile devices in the evening more
than desktops). Afterwards for each Canvas fingerprinting sample, we picked 90%
of the fingerprints for each sample and calculated the entropy for this 90%. We
repeated this 10 times for each of the 23 Canvas samples we gathered. The 90%
happens to be 471 or 472. While doing this, we ensured that a single fingerprint
value gathered from a Canvas sample coming from a user visit is included exactly
9 times. This is to ensure that all the values are represented enough in this as-
sessment. Table 4.6 lists all the entropies calculated for each of the 10 90% folds,
calculated for the 23 Canvas samples.
After calculating the entropy of the 10 folds of fingerprint values for each
Canvas sample, we calculated several other relevant values: the mean of the 10
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folds’ entropy (to compare it with overall entropy of the entire sample of 524 visits),
highest fold entropy, lowest fold entropy and the standard deviation. Table 4.7
summarizes these values for every Canvas sample, while Figure 4.3 presents this
information in a plot with the Canvas sample number in the x-axis and entropy
value in the y-axis. The values in the plot include the overall entropy of a single
Canvas sample (based on the 524 user visits) represented by the blue diamond,
the mean of the 10 folds’ entropies represented by the orange circle, and the
highest and lowest fold entropy represented by 2 ”X” symbols. The closer the
overall entropy to the mean entropy of the 10 folds, the more confidence we have
in the reported Canvas sample entropy. If we look at the plot in Figure 4.3, we
find that 3 of the Canvas samples (i.e. Canvas 15, 17 and 20) happen to have
the overall entropy within 1 standard deviation around the mean entropy, giving
more confidence of the reported results for these samples. One of these samples
is our enhanced Canvas sample we propose for the best distinguishing (Sample
20). The plot also shows that 11 of the Canvas samples have the overall entropy
within the highest and lowest fold entropy of the same Canvas, which shows
high confidence that is relatively less than when the overall entropy is within the
standard deviation from the mean entropy. These 11 Canvas samples are Canvas
samples 1, 2, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 22. We dropped Canvas sample 2
from the plot due to its low entropy, to makes the plot more interpretable to the
reader. The Canvas samples’ printed images and their description are available in
Appendix A.
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Figure 4.3: Overall vs. Mean Entropy
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Canvas 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Sample Fold Fold Fold Fold Fold Fold Fold Fold Fold Fold
Can. 1 0.631 0.631 0.615 0.625 0.626 0.628 0.623 0.618 0.616 0.629
Can. 2 0.356 0.351 0.351 0.354 0.346 0.357 0.358 0.346 0.353 0.355
Can. 3 0.524 0.522 0.528 0.525 0.524 0.524 0.528 0.529 0.526 0.521
Can. 4 0.614 0.622 0.618 0.616 0.616 0.624 0.620 0.619 0.618 0.616
Can. 5 0.645 0.642 0.648 0.641 0.646 0.650 0.652 0.651 0.644 0.648
Can. 6 0.648 0.646 0.641 0.652 0.648 0.652 0.645 0.649 0.653 0.655
Can. 7 0.680 0.681 0.680 0.679 0.682 0.682 0.684 0.681 0.685 0.681
Can. 8 0.665 0.659 0.668 0.658 0.663 0.665 0.664 0.667 0.666 0.661
Can. 9 0.677 0.682 0.686 0.682 0.681 0.681 0.679 0.681 0.682 0.679
Can. 10 0.553 0.559 0.558 0.563 0.556 0.560 0.564 0.564 0.564 0.563
Can. 11 0.566 0.556 0.562 0.559 0.559 0.562 0.561 0.564 0.557 0.561
Can. 12 0.478 0.473 0.473 0.480 0.475 0.479 0.469 0.465 0.470 0.475
Can. 13 0.525 0.529 0.531 0.524 0.534 0.530 0.529 0.532 0.530 0.539
Can. 14 0.540 0.548 0.546 0.541 0.547 0.544 0.542 0.545 0.535 0.545
Can. 15 0.507 0.529 0.529 0.513 0.519 0.527 0.521 0.527 0.524 0.528
Can. 16 0.515 0.527 0.520 0.518 0.526 0.522 0.524 0.521 0.521 0.524
Can. 17 0.488 0.499 0.486 0.488 0.480 0.487 0.497 0.488 0.492 0.497
Can. 18 0.660 0.660 0.674 0.666 0.662 0.661 0.666 0.671 0.662 0.658
Can. 19 0.880 0.875 0.879 0.879 0.878 0.878 0.876 0.884 0.876 0.878
Can. 20 0.833 0.849 0.844 0.834 0.838 0.844 0.842 0.850 0.838 0.850
Can. 21 0.497 0.498 0.499 0.497 0.491 0.497 0.500 0.498 0.501 0.498
Can. 22 0.651 0.662 0.660 0.646 0.652 0.658 0.654 0.656 0.653 0.662
Can. 23 0.841 0.843 0.847 0.843 0.841 0.845 0.838 0.841 0.840 0.842
Table 4.6: Normalized Entropy of Random 90% Folds of Each Canvas Sample
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Canvas Mean Ent. Overall Highest Lowest Std. Dev. Mean Mean
Sample of Folds Entropy Fold Ent. Fold Ent. (x10−3) - STD + STD
Can. 1 0.624 0.617 0.631 0.615 5.89 0.618 0.630
Can. 2 0.353 0.348 0.358 0.346 4.07 0.349 0.357
Can. 3 0.525 0.518 0.529 0.521 2.61 0.522 0.528
Can. 4 0.618 0.610 0.624 0.614 3.06 0.615 0.621
Can. 5 0.647 0.638 0.652 0.641 3.72 0.643 0.650
Can. 6 0.649 0.641 0.655 0.641 4.18 0.645 0.653
Can. 7 0.681 0.673 0.685 0.679 1.78 0.679 0.683
Can. 8 0.663 0.656 0.668 0.658 3.39 0.660 0.667
Can. 9 0.681 0.673 0.686 0.677 2.25 0.679 0.683
Can. 10 0.560 0.553 0.564 0.553 3.96 0.557 0.564
Can. 11 0.561 0.554 0.566 0.556 2.96 0.558 0.564
Can. 12 0.474 0.468 0.480 0.465 4.66 0.469 0.478
Can. 13 0.530 0.524 0.539 0.524 4.25 0.526 0.534
Can. 14 0.543 0.536 0.548 0.535 3.91 0.539 0.547
Can. 15 0.522 0.516 0.529 0.507 7.40 0.515 0.530
Can. 16 0.522 0.515 0.527 0.515 3.65 0.518 0.525
Can. 17 0.490 0.484 0.499 0.480 5.90 0.484 0.496
Can. 18 0.664 0.657 0.674 0.658 5.31 0.659 0.669
Can. 19 0.878 0.873 0.884 0.875 2.44 0.876 0.881
Can. 20 0.842 0.837 0.850 0.833 6.36 0.836 0.848
Can. 21 0.498 0.491 0.501 0.491 2.66 0.495 0.500
Can. 22 0.655 0.648 0.662 0.646 5.23 0.650 0.661
Can. 23 0.842 0.836 0.847 0.838 2.71 0.839 0.845
Table 4.7: Reliability of our Reported Canvas Samples’ Normalized Entropy
63
Our enhanced Canvas sample is composed of a linear gradient with 5 color
stops in the background, two stroke rectangles with round edges and different line
widths, and two filled rectangles, one of which is transparent. All the shapes have
shadows, different colors, positions and dimensions, and some of them overlapping.
On top of that are all the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and
25 characters, printed twice in the Windows local fonts “Palatino Linotype” and
“Arial” with a size of 25, in addition to 21 different selected emojis. Fig. 4.4
shows our enhanced Canvas sample.
Figure 4.4: Our Enhanced Canvas Sample (Canvas 20)
4.5 General Observations
The following observations are drawn from the various Canvas samples we gath-
ered in Appendix A and show the impact of changing some factors on the number
of distinct fingerprint values (refer to Fig. 4.2 and Table 4.2 for better visualiza-
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tion). Utilizing these observations can help in improving the samples a website
uses to fingerprint its users.
• Canvas sample 2 contains 4 shapes in black, whereas Canvas 3 have the
same 4 shapes in 4 different colors. By changing the colors, the number of
distinct fingerprint values increased from 36 to 60.
• Canvas sample 3 has a white background, by changing the background into
a gradient with 5 colors as in Canvas 5, the number of distinct fingerprint
values increased from 60 to 105.
• Canvas 9 is the same as Canvas 5, except that the shapes have shadows,
which increased number of distinct values from 105 to 132.
• By printing all the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 25
characters twice in different Windows available fonts and adding many Emo-
jis, the number of distinct fingerprint values increased from 132 in Canvas
9 to 276 in Canvas 20.
• Canvas 21 is what several researchers use for fingerprinting the users. By
increasing the size of the sample (i.e. pixels) and adding more distinct
letters and characters in Canvas 22, the number of distinct fingerprint values
increased from 79 to 135.
• Canvas 1 contains some text and an Emoji, which results in 119 distinct
fingerprint values. By printing many emojis (even with no text at all) in
Canvas 18, the number of distinct fingerprint values became 152.
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• Increasing the font size results in more distinct values as in Canvas 10 with
the font Arial size 18 and 96 distinct values versus Canvas 11 with the font
Arial size 20 and 99 distinct values. Also applies to samples 12 and 13, using
Sirin Stencil (a font that is imported Google Web Fonts server) with sizes
12 and 15, resulting in 83 and 88 distinct fingerprint values respectively.
• Canvas 19 and Canvas 20 have the same components, except that Canvas
19 uses a font that is imported Google Web Fonts server. Because of this,
Canvas 19 resulted in 317 distinct values as opposed to 276 in Canvas 20.
This increase in Canvas 19 is caused by the occasional failure in loading the
font from the web, which would be misleading as a device can have different
fingerprints at different user visits.
• Printing a picture in a Canvas, like in sample 23, can be as good as our
suggested enhanced Canvas version (i.e. Canvas 20) which contains many
other various components.
• Google Chrome and Opera showed to have the most similar fingerprints
among the other browsers when installed on the same device. Most of the
Canvas samples obtained gave the same fingerprint for both browsers on the
same device. However, our enhanced sample (Canvas 20) was able to distin-
guish both browsers. Unlike earlier ones, this observation is based on over
60 submissions we performed on Google Cloud servers using the browsers:
Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Firefox and Opera. We changed the
hardware specifications after submitting the form from the 4 browsers.
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4.6 Why Canvas is a Reliable Fingerprint
When Mowery et al. discovered the possibility of using Canvas to fingerprint
users in 2012, they mentioned several characteristics that make Canvas a desirable
fingerprinting technique [3]. These characteristics include: consistency in getting
the same Canvas fingerprint value from the same user device, the high entropy
in the returned value, transparency to the user as there is no indication that
they are being fingerprinted, being independent of other fingerprints, and finally
being readily obtainable since there is no access permission required to be able to
fingerprint users.
Laperdrix et al. constructed a 17-attribute fingerprinting technique, and stud-
ied the distinguishing capabilities of each attribute on a dataset of 118,934 fin-
gerprinted users, which was collected through a website they published: AmIU-
nique.org [1]. Table 4.8 summarizes the Normalized Shannons Entropy for the top
4 gathered attributes through the AmIUnique.org website for all of their samples,
and divided by desktop samples only then mobile samples only. We notice that
the normalized entropy is very low for the list of plugins and fonts for mobile
devices, indicating that it can be challenging to fingerprint mobile devices using
the list of plugins, due to the absence of plugins in mobile devices, and the list of
fonts, given that a considerable proportion of the mobile devices do not have flash
activated, and the flash API is used to gather the list of fonts. With the increased
adoption and use of mobile devices to surf the web, it is important for fingerprint-
ing attributes to have high entropy for both desktop and mobile devices. User
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Agent and Canvas remain on the top of the attributes that have similar and high
entropy for both desktops and mobile devices.
Table 4.8: Normalized Shannons Entropy for the Top 4 AMIUNIQUES Attributes
[1]
Attribute All Desktop Mobile
List of plugins 0.656 0.718 0.081
User agent 0.580 0.550 0.741
List of fonts 0.497 0.548 0.033
Canvas 0.491 0.475 0.512
The reasons why we see high potential in Canvas is that the web application
which is fingerprinting users have control over what to render on the clients ma-
chine. Therefore, enhancing the sample gathered would increase the entropy and
consequently the distinguishing capability significantly, unlike fonts, plugins and
user-agent, which web applications do not have control over. Looking at the num-
ber of distinct fingerprints obtained by our enhanced Canvas sample (i.e. Canvas
sample 20) in our experiment in this chapter, the results are promising. The num-
bers of distinct fingerprint values achieved by each of the non-Canvas fingerprint
we gathered are all way less than our enhanced Canvas sample. With this, it is
possible to enhance the distinguishability of users by utilizing enhanced samples
of Canvas.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we aimed to provide high entropy Canvas samples to be used for
better fingerprinting, check how their entropy compare to Canvas and non-Canvas
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Figure 4.5: Number of Distinct Values per Non-Canvas Fingerprints
fingerprints, and come up with conclusions on how the different components added
to a Canvas sample can boost the entropy. To achieve our targets we developed a
website and hosted it publicly, asking users to enter details about the device from
which they are visiting, while the website gathers 23 Canvas fingerprints and 17
non-Canvas fingerprints from each user visit. The website was distributed to our
acquaintances, the academic community, social networks and paid visitors from
Mechanical Turk, who provided 701 submissions, filtered down to 524 included in
our study.
Our three topmost Canvas samples in entropy are higher than any Canvas and
non-Canvas fingerprints in the literature reviewed in Section 2.2.2. The analysis
show that the more content and characteristics a Canvas sample includes, the more
capable it is in distinguishing web users. Our proposed enhanced version has all
alphabetical characters written in several fonts, over 20 emojis, several shapes,
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shadows, and a completely covered background, resulting a normalized entropy
of 0.837. The output of this empirical study confirm our initial expectation that
the entropy of Canvas fingerprinting can be boosted by the web application that
wishes to fingerprint users, as opposed to other types of fingerprints.
To assess the reliability of our reported findings, we compared the Shannon
Entropy of a commonly used Canvas sample in our dataset versus AmIUnique,
and the entropy in both dataset was almost identical, which gives confidence that
our dataset is valid and representative of similar large dataset when calculating
other samples’ entropies. As another data validation measure, we calculated the
entropy of ten 90% folds for each Canvas sample and compared the mean entropy
resulted with the overall entropy of all the samples. The sample we propose in
this chapter (sample 20) happened to have the overall entropy within one standard
deviation from the mean entropy of the 10 folds. Finally, the Operating Systems
percentages in our dataset is the closest to the actual Operating Systems market
share when compared to the significant fingerprinting dataset in section 2.3, and





This chapter visits two different applications that can significantly benefit from
Canvas fingerprinting. These two applications are the detection of fake accounts
on web applications and the prevention of session hijacking. In this chapter, we
propose a methodology for both applications. In addition to that, an empirical
study has been carried out to understand the effectiveness of the proposed tech-
nique in detecting fake accounts on web applications, and a proof of concept was
built to test the usage of Canvas fingerprinting in session hijacking prevention.
5.1 Motivation
Detecting fake accounts on web applications and online social networks have sev-
eral benefits including preventing the owners of these accounts to sell unauthentic
“likes” and followers on these social networks. Moreover, the detection of fake ac-
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counts prevents attackers from creating many accounts for illegitimate purposes
such as studying the session management of a website to find vulnerabilities that
can be exploited. In addition to that, the results of behavior studies of the target
audience of a website may be impacted, which may cause financial implications if
the website operators took decisions depending on these studies. For these reasons
and multiple other reasons, we proposed the use of Canvas fingerprint to detect
the creation of fake accounts in websites and online social networks [2].
Cookies are being used for session authentication since mid-90’s. When a user
logs in to a web application and his credentials get validated, session cookies are
generated and sent to the client’s web browser. The web browser then attaches the
cookie values in every subsequent request to prove that the user is authenticated
[42], instead of the need for users to provide their credentials in every sensitive
page they visit. Session hijacking happens when an unauthorized user steals a
session that belongs to another user by obtaining the other user’s cookies, which
gives the stealer unauthorized access to information or services. Therefore, it
became important to provide protection measures against session hijacking.
5.2 Proposed Methodology
The methodology we propose for our two security applications are composed of a
two-stage process that starts with rendering and drawing some shapes or text on
a Canvas after the HTML page is sent to the user’s browser. Then, the website re-
trieves the pixel data back and stores it in the database to use it for identifying the
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user or the session depending on the application. Choosing Canvas fingerprinting
for the two applications comes from the consistency in the pixel data retrieved
from the Canvas across different user visits from the same device, in addition to
the high entropy which helps in differentiating users (refer to Section 4.6). The
Canvas fingerprint is linked to the user account in the fake accounts detection ap-
plication. Therefore, if the number of accounts with the same Canvas fingerprint is
large, flags should be raised and investigated as they may indicate that the owner
of these accounts is the same person. On the other hand, the Canvas fingerprint
is linked to the session of the user in the session hijacking prevention application.
So, if the value of this fingerprint is changed while the same session is active, it
means the users session has been stolen, because the Canvas fingerprint is more
persistent than the user’s session. The proposed process for both applications
has two stages: Canvas storing and Canvas checking. The Canvas storing stage is
similar in the two applications, while the checking stage takes different approaches
based on the application. The first stage of the fake accounts detection process
is implemented in the registration HTML page. The registration web page has a
Canvas HTML element <canvas> with shapes or text rendered on it in the client
machine. When the user signs up for a new account and his input gets validated,
the JavaScript function toDataURL() retrieves the Base64 representation of the
pixel data. This data is hashed and stored in the database associated with the
username of the newly created account. A brief overview of the storing stage
is summarized in Figure 5.1. The first stage of the session hijacking prevention
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process is implemented in the login page and the Canvas pixel data is retrieved
the same way when the user logs in and used as a fingerprint for the user session.
Figure 5.1: Canvas Storing Stage of the Detection Process [2]
The second stage of the fake account detection process checks for repeated
fingerprints in the database that are associated with different accounts at the
time of accounts creation. When the number of accounts associated with a single
fingerprint exceeds a specific threshold, the operators of this website or online
social network should perform further investigation as this gives an indication
that these accounts may be fake accounts that belong to the same user, and
that they could be used to perform malicious activities. The threshold should be
specified taking into account statistical analyses to reach an optimal value that
reduces false positives and false negatives. The authors of Beauty and the Beast
published the website AmIUnique.org to analyze 17 attributes that can be used to
fingerprint users, including Canvas fingerprint [1]. The analysis showed that the
118,934 responses have 8,375 distinct Canvas values, with an average of around
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14 sample per Canvas value. This study and similar ones would help in deciding
the best thresholds. After the analysis and investigations, the operator can take
the appropriate actions such as disabling or blacklisting the accounts. Figure 5.2
covers the Canvas repetition checking stage of the detection process.
Figure 5.2: Repetition Checking Stage of the Fake Accounts Detection Process [2]
The second stage of the session hijacking prevention process checks if the
Canvas value associated with the session which was stored in the first stage is
still the same. This stage is deployed in any webpages the web applications
owners would like to secure against session hijacking. When the user navigates
to a sensitive page in which the Canvas checking function is implemented, the
web application retrieves the pixel data resulted from rendering the same Canvas
and hashes it using the same hash function used in the first stage. After that,
the Canvas fingerprint newly generated in the second stage is compared to the
fingerprint stored earlier in the database during the first stage of the process. If
the newly generated fingerprint matches the stored one, it means that the current
session belongs to the same legitimate user who successfully logged in earlier,
and the user will be able to access and stay at the same page she was requesting.
If the result is a mismatch, then there is a very high probability that the user’s
session has been hijacked and the user will be redirected to the login page to
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re-enter her credentials, and if correctly entered, the value of the new fingerprint
is stored in the database as in the Canvas storing stage that was done at the login
time. The implementation of this process can accommodate users who login from
different devices at the same time by allowing the web application to store more
than one session ID per user with their associated Canvas fingerprint for each
device. Figure 5.3 illustrates the second stage of the session hijacking prevention
process.
Figure 5.3: Checking Stage of the Session Hijacking Prevention Process
The target of the two-stage processes is protecting web applications from the
creation of fake account and users’ sessions from getting hijacked. Hence, it is
not required to gather user identifying information that can be considered as a
privacy breach. This is why we are using the fingerprint as a black-box and only
store the hash of the pixel data we get back from the Canvas. The hashing is
expected to introduce collisions, which can be taken into consideration by the
person performing the analysis in the second stage of the fake account detection
process. The collisions are not very critical in the session hijacking application
either since what we care about is detecting if the person using the session is not
the owner of the account, as opposed to having unique identifiers for users.
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5.3 Empirical Study of the Fake Account Detec-
tion Application
A simple website with user registration functionality was built and hosted publicly.
PHP was used as the server side programming language, and JavaScript was the
client side scripting language. Figure 5.4 shows how the website looks like. We
selected 14 different participants to take part of this empirical study. For the
accessibility of the research participants, we selected university students that were
attending an Information Security Fundamentals course, who were also aware of
the purpose of the experiment beforehand. It was not a requirement to have
participants that are privacy or security aware. Any participant with basic skills
on browsing the web would be sufficient. Our selection of the privacy aware
participants has impacted our reported false negatives rate. After that, we asked
the participants to register on the website a random number of times with different
usernames and passwords each time. The total number of registered accounts was
148 account. We then tried to use the participants’ input to detect which group
of accounts belong to the same user by following the two-stage process described
earlier. To validate the output of our analysis of Canvases to determine if Canvas
fingerprints belong to the same user, we asked the users to provide their email
addresses every time they sign up for a new account.
The experiment showed that the proposed detection process is effective in
detecting which accounts belong to the same user with a good accuracy. Table
5.1 points out the expected flags that should be raised when a fake account is
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Figure 5.4: Simple Website with Registration Functionality
created, and compares it with actual raised flags. A flag is raised when a Canvas
fingerprint being stored in the database matches at least one value previously
stored.
A total of 120 flags were raised in the repetition checking stage. 8 of these flags
were false positive. These cases occurred because of machines with very similar
or identical hardware and software specifications. In one of the cases, a collision
occurred by two desktop machines next to each other in a lab. The checking
stage did not alert for 9 flags. 8 of these flags were missed because the users
were changing the browser’s configurations by changing the zoom ratio. When
investigated, we found out that this was due to some participants using Mozilla
Firefox, who were intentionally trying to register for multiple account while being
undetected. This is an impact of our selection for the participants of our empirical
study, which could have been avoided if we selected random web users. With
further analysis and replication of their activity, we saw that in some cases the
zoom ratio had impact on the fingerprints coming from Mozilla Firefox. We were
not able to replicate this behavior on any other browser. One missed flag was
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because Internet Explorer 8 does not support Canvas. The Canvas sample used in
this experiment is sample 1 in Appendix A. Using a sample with a better entropy
(like Sample 20) could have decreased the false positives. It is noteworthy that this
study included 148 registered accounts that were created by 14 participant, which
might not adequate to represent the rate of false positives and false negatives
that would be observed if the study covered the entire population of web users.
However, this study shows initial findings on the effectiveness of the proposed
technique, and could be expanded to cover significantly larger audience for more
accurate results.




Falsely Raised Flags (False Positives) 8
Missed Flags (False Negatives) 9
False Positives Inaccuracy 6.67%
False Negatives Inaccuracy 7.44%
5.4 Proof of Concept for the Session Hijacking
Prevention Application
As a proof of concept, we developed a website using PHP as the server side
language, and JavaScript as the client side scripting language. This website has
basic login functionality that enables the user who is successfully logged in to
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post comments. This website is vulnerable to session hijacking, meaning that by
copying the cookie value that is created to store the session to another browser in
the same device or a different device, the session is obtained without the need to
provide the username and password.
To protect against stealing sessions, we implemented the proposed solution by
building two extra functions: Store Canvas and Check Canvas. When a user enters
the credentials and logs in successfully, the Store Canvas function renders some
text on the Canvas, retrieves pixel data, and then calculates the fingerprint and
stores it in the database associated with the current session. The Check Canvas
function is included in every sensitive page in the website, so that whenever the
user who has the current session visits a sensitive web page, the Check Canvas
function renders the same text on the Canvas, retrieves pixel data, calculates the
fingerprint, and compares it to the fingerprint stored earlier in the database. In
the case of a mismatch, the user is sent back to the login page to provide the
credentials since there is a high probability that the session has been stolen.
We tested the website after adding the Store Canvas and Check Canvas func-
tions. When the user logged in to a browser, a new cookie was created to store
the session, and the user was able to post comments to the website. When the
cookie value was copied to another browser in the same device or in a different
device, and tried to post a comment, the web application detected that the Canvas
fingerprint associated to the session has changed and redirected the user to the
login page to enter the credentials. When entering the correct credentials from
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the other browser, the fingerprint stored in the database was updated with the
new fingerprint value.
5.5 Existing Techniques to Detect Fake Ac-
counts and Prevent Session Hijacking
Several researchers approached the problem of detecting the creation of fake ac-
counts from different angles. Some researchers tried to detect the creation of bulk
of fake accounts by finding patterns in the username of the account and patterns
in the time of certain activities performed by the account owner, such as posting
or tweeting in specific and fixed time patterns [43]. Other researchers analyze the
mutual friends between accounts and use this to indicate whether some accounts
are fake [44]. These detection techniques can be circumvented by the creator of
the fake accounts. For example, the creation can happen in random times to
avoid the fixed time patterns, and the usernames can be randomized in order not
to have detectable naming patterns. The technique proposed in this research does
not rely on finding time and naming patterns, nor does it rely on mutual friends
analysis. Thus, it can be implemented in addition to the existing techniques to
achieve layered security.
In an effort to prevent session hijacking, the authors of [45] presented a client
side mechanism named SessionShield, which protects users against session hijack-
ing even if the web application is vulnerable. The idea of SessionShield works by
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detecting and isolating session identifiers from the browser, as this information is
not used by legitimate client side scripts. Another research proposes getting rid
of cookies completely and deploying One Time Cookies (OTC). OTC is resistant
to session hijacking, and keeps the simplicity and performance advantages of con-
ventional cookies [42]. The technique proposed in this research is a server side
protection measure that can be employed easily in a web application along with
other server side and client side techniques without needing to deploy a whole new
cookies system and without compromising performance.
5.6 Conclusion
Canvas fingerprinting is typically used by web applications to track users, but it
can also be utilized for the good. In this chapter we proposed and explored two
novel constructive use cases. We also studied the effectiveness of these use cases.
The first use case we propose helps detecting the creation of fake accounts
on social networks. This protects the web application owners from unneeded
behaviors such as the selling of unauthentic followers, and impacting the target
audience analyses performed by the web application owners. For this we propose a
two stage process that starts with retrieving and storing the Canvas fingerprint at
the time of account creation, and linking it to the user created. The second stage
checks for repeated fingerprints and raises alerts for potential fake accounts. The
empirical study we performed to validate this technique raised 120 flags where 121
flags were expected, resulting in 6.67% false positives and 7.44% false negatives.
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The second use case prevents session hijacking. To implement this use case,
the Canvas fingerprint is linked to the user session, since the fingerprint is more
persistent than the session. the web application checks for the fingerprint in the
sensitive web pages. If the fingerprint is different while the same session is active,
this indicates a stolen session and the application asks the user to re-enter their






The purpose of this chapter of our research is to show specific examples of how
web applications could utilize the easily obtainable Canvas fingerprints to de-
anonymize web users. We present here five different targets of de-anonymizing
users, and how they can be achieved via Canvas.
1. Linking guest user to a logged in user
2. Conclude a person or entity owns several accounts, or that several users are
related (e.g. family members, roommates, friends or classmates)
3. Conclude that a user owns several devices
4. Attribute activities done across different web applications to the same user
even when using different browsers on the same or different devices
5. Confirmation of identity speculation
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This chapter also explains how the Tor browser protects users from being
fingerprinted via Canvas, and sheds the light on some functionality failures Tor
users face when using Canvas applications.
6.1 Linking a guest user to a logged in user
Let us say a website W would like to identify its guest users and link them to
registered user accounts. This would typically be done easily via cookies. How-
ever, a privacy aware user who would like to protect their identity can erase the
cookies. Website W can utilize Canvas to identify its visitors as in Fig. 6.1 and
as demonstrated in these steps:
1. If a Visitor V1 visits website W and performs some activities as a guest user
(even if the visitor doesnt own an account yet), the website will link the
activity to the visitors fingerprint F1.
2. If in the future a Visitor V2 visits the same website W while being logged in
as user U with a fingerprint F2 that is equal to F1, the website can attribute
the activities done by the guest user to the user U, and can conclude that
V1 = V2.
85
Figure 6.1: Linking a guest user to a logged in user
6.2 Conclude a person or entity owns several ac-
counts
Lets say a website W uses Canvas to identify its visitors as in Fig. 6.2 and the
following steps:
1. If a Visitor V1 visits the website W while being logged in as user U1, the
website will link the user U1 to the obtained fingerprint F1.
2. If in the future a Visitor V2 visits the same website W while being logged in
as user U2 whose fingerprint F2 is equal to F1, the website can understand
that the owner of U1 and U2 is the same person, or that the visitors V1 and
V2 are related (e.g. family members, roommates, friends or classmates)
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Figure 6.2: Conclude a person or entity owns several accounts
6.3 Conclude that a user owns several devices
Lets say a website W uses Canvas to identify its visitors as in Fig. 6.3 and the
following steps:
1. If a Visitor visits the website W and performs some activities while being
logged in as user U, the website will link the fingerprint F1 to the User U,
and can as well record the type of activities done while the fingerprint is F1.
2. If in the future a Visitor visits the same website W while being logged in as
the same user U with a fingerprint F2 that is different from F1, and performs
different types of activities from the first visit, the website can know that the
user U owns two different devices and understand which types of activities
the user performs from each.
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Figure 6.3: Conclude a user owns several devices
6.4 Attribute activities done across different
web applications to the same user despite
using different devices
Let us say websites W1 and W2 use Canvas to identify their visitors, and are
owned by the same entity or have mutual agreement to share users fingerprints
(Note that W1 and W2 can be the same website). W1 and W2 can utilize the
steps in Fig. 6.4 and described as follows:
1. If a visitor V1 visits the website W1 without being logged, the website will
link the activities done by V1 to the obtained fingerprint F1.
2. If V1 visits W2 while being logged as user U, W2 will link the User U to
the obtained Fingerprint F1.
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3. Once a visitor V2 logs in to W2 as user U, W2 will link the newly obtained
fingerprint F2 to the same user U. Therefore, F1 and F2 potentially belong
to the same person.
4. Given that W1 and W2 share the fingerprints information, if V2 visits W1
without being logged in, W1 will be able to attribute the activities done by
V2 to the same source as V1.
Figure 6.4: Attribute Activities to Users Across Devices
6.5 Confirmation of identity speculation
Lets say websites W1 and W2 constructed their own banks of Canvas fingerprints
that link each of their registered users to the fingerprints of the devices from which
they regularly visit the websites, and assuming that the websites are owned by
the same entity or have mutual agreement to share users fingerprints. An identity
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speculation can be confirmed as in Fig. 6.5 and the following steps:
• User U1 has an account on website W1, and speaks up about sensitive
matters using a pseudonym.
• User U2 has an account on website W2, and has provided his accurate
identifying information like his name and email address.
• One of the websites (or a governmental entity) suspects that user U1 is the
same as user U2 (e.g. because they use the same style of writing), and wishes
to confirm this speculation.
• As users U1 and U2 visit the websites W1 and W2 respectively from multiple
devices, W1 would populate its bank of fingerprints by linking U1 to the
fingerprints of the devices used in the visits, and W2 would populate its
bank the same way.
• By comparing the fingerprints of the devices associated to the two users in
each of the fingerprint banks, it is possible to confirm the speculation if some
fingerprints match, and the confidence would increase when more matches
are found.
Note that W1 and W2 can be the same website, and that the same approach
still applies to users visiting the websites from the same device using browsers
with different fingerprints.
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Figure 6.5: Confirmation of identity speculation
6.6 Privacy of Tor Browser Users
A user of Tor is protected from getting fingerprinted via Canvas on at least two
layers: the scripting language level, and the specific implementation Tor for Can-
vas. At the scripting language level, the user of Tor has the option of stopping
any scripts from running on the browser by enabling the option “Forbid Scripts
Globally”, which is what Tor recommends, and what a typical privacy aware user
would choose. If this option is enabled, the user experience browsing the web
would not be smooth, because many dynamic web pages will not function prop-
erly with the scripting language disabled. In our case, all the Canvas applications
and games failed when using this option since Canvas requires a scripting lan-
guage. Tor browser has an effective mechanism that informs the user when a
website is trying to obtain the Canvas fingerprint by looking for calls to the func-
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tion toDataURL() and displaying the pop up in Fig. 6.6 if any is found. The
user has the following three options to select from:
• “Not Now”
• “Never for this site”
• “Allow in the future”
With the first option being the default and the second being the recommended
option. Tor does not allow the fingerprinting to happen unless the user approves
it.
Figure 6.6: Canvas Fingerprint Alert in Tor
Many Canvas applications work fine with Tor as long as the fingerprinting
algorithm is not used. If the function toDataURL() is a requirement in imple-
menting a Canvas application (like for saving the resulted picture from a Canvas
Paint application), the application works fine until the user tries to store the pic-
ture of the Canvas, then Tor would display the Canvas fingerprinting alert asking
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for users approval. Fig. 6.7 shows this scenario in action, where we only got the
fingerprinting alert at the time of saving the picture. In some Cases, we observed
failure in the functionality of some Canvas applications when using Tor, while the
applications work fine in other major browsers. Fig. 6.8 shows an example of a
Paint application that failed to store the drawing when browsing via Tor, while
the application works fine on other browsers.
Figure 6.7: Paint Application Based on Canvas Only Displaying the Alert When
Saving the Drawing
While studying how applications function on Tor versus other browsers, the
alert Tor displays gave us insights on some applications that may appear to be
using Canvas only for legitimate purposes, while in fact it uses Canvas for tracking
users as well. Fig. 6.9 is for a game that allowed us to play and at a certain point
the alert was triggered, which indicates the site is trying to fingerprint users. Not
allowing the fingerprinting did not prevent us from continuing playing.
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Figure 6.8: Canvas Paint Application Failing to Store the Drawing in Tor
Figure 6.9: Canvas Game Trying to Fingerprint Users
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed five specific scenarios where Canvas fingerprints
can be utilized by web applications to de-anonymize web users. Some of these
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scenarios -if not all- may have been implemented by web applications to track the
users across web applications, even when using different devices. Our research
provides more accuracy and effectiveness to these applications that attack privacy
especially when the tracking web applications utilize our enhanced Canvas sample,
or follow the guidelines we provide in Chapter 4 to create their own Canvas sample.
It is noteworthy that there are companies specialized in cross-device tracking using
a combination of several techniques [28]. These companies store graphs that link
users to their devices, and can provide this information to other parties or web
applications which subscribe to the service and may also be sharing information
back with the tracking companies.
This chapter also demonstrates that while Tor browser provides effective mech-
anisms to protect web users from being fingerprinted, these mechanisms do not
affect the importance and relevance of performing research on Canvas for several
reasons, including the inconvenience caused for normal web users in terms of func-
tionality failure as well as the large number of alerts that a user needs to respond
to. Moreover, considering the portion of web users who are using Tor on regular
basis, they account for a negligible percentage of those whom a web application
owner wishes to track. According to StatCounter, the top 29 used web browsers
account for over 99.8% of the market share as of October 2018. These 29 browsers






This chapter explains how we validated our performed empirical studies and points
out the threats we see to the validity of our research in Section 7.1, while Section
7.2 gives the research community the key elements with which they can replicate
our research to confirm our findings, or to pick up from where we reached with
our empirical studies instead of reinventing the wheel. Finally, we conclude this
thesis and suggest future direction. The sections of this chapter refer mainly to
the four major experiments and empirical studies we carried out:
1. Canvas prevalence on the web
2. Canvas distinguishing capability analysis
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3. Detecting the creation of fake accounts on web applications
4. Session hijacking prevention on web applications
7.1 Research Validation and Threats to Validity
When studying the Canvas prevalence in Chapter 3.2 to show the cost of dis-
abling Canvas, our initial results showed that only 2.45% websites use Canvas.
However, when validating this by comparing with the literature, we found that a
research published in 2014 showed that over 5.5% of the top 100,000 Alexa web-
sites used Canvas for tracking purposes [4], and this percentage kept growing till
it reached 10.44% in April 2016 when measured on the top 10,000 Alexa websites
[32], which cannot be more than the number of websites using Canvas in general
for all purposes. After investigations, we found out that our scrapping algorithm
misses some cases with which Canvas can be included in a website. Our revised
algorithm showed that 24.04% of websites use Canvas as of January 2018.
We reported in Chapter 3.2 that 21.96% of the top 10,000 Alexa websites were
detected by our crawling script to be using Canvas for all purposes, and estimated
that 11.52% of them (over 50% of the reported) use Canvas for legitimate purposes.
This estimation has three threats to validity. First, one year and nine months
separate the execution of our crawling script and the crawling done by [32], which
may have impacted the percentage of deployed Canvas for fingerprinting purposes
on the web. Second, it is possible that the reported percentage of websites using
Canvas fingerprinting in [32] was subject to false negatives especially with their
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false positive elimination criteria, and consequently affecting their reported results.
Third, since the estimation of the of the Canvas used for legitimate purposes is a
direct subtraction of the overall usage minus tracking usage, it considers a website
that uses Canvas for both legitimate and tracking purposes only in the tracking
side, which is a more restrictive (hence safer) assumption that may only reduce
the prevalence for legitimate usage. These three threats are only for the estimated
prevalence for legitimate purposes, while the overall percentage we reported does
not change.
In addition to the Canvas samples we designed to fingerprint the users in the
Canvas distinguishing capability analysis performed in Chapter 4, we also gathered
the Canvas sample used widely (like in [1] and [4]) to confirm the quality of our
data by comparing the entropy we get in our dataset with the other large datasets
including AmIUnique [1] when using the same fingerprinting sample. The entorpy
obtained by the Canvas sample in both datasets is almost identical, showing the
reliability of our dataset. We also gathered 17 non-Canvas fingerprints to study
the effectiveness of Canvas against each fingerprint, showing that Canvas is the
highest in entopy and distinguishing capability. A threat to the validity of this
empirical study is that we based our analysis on 701 user responses (524 after
filtration), as opposed to 118,934 in the research performed by Laperdrix et al.
[1], and the potential bias the distribution of our dataset, as the different versions
of Windows constructed 56% of the responses, and the submissions done from the
Chrome browser were 70% of the dataset.
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The empirical study performed in Chapter 5 aimed to asses the effectiveness
of the technique we proposed for detecting the creation of fake accounts on web
applications using Canvas. The study was based on 148 registered accounts cre-
ated by 14 different people. These numbers may not be sufficient to accurately
represent the false positives and negatives when it comes to the entire population
of web users, but they give an indication to the effectiveness of the technique.
Chapter 6 discusses five scenarios of how to attack the privacy of web users
and de-anonymize them. In these scenarios the attacks are shown in diagrams and
explained theoretically, but the effectiveness is not empirically proven yet because
this is not in the scope of our research. As a future direction, it is valuable to
design empirical studies that show the effectiveness of these scenarios, and assess
the potential overhead.
7.2 Replication and Reproducing Results
In the Canvas prevalence empirical study of our research, we showed that the per-
centage of websites including Canvas exceeds 24%, which proved the high cost of
disabling Canvas at the browser level. In order for researchers to see how our find-
ings may change over the time, we created a repository with the source code we
used to reach our results, which takes a CSV file (with the list of URLs to be vis-
ited) as an input and outputs a subset list of URLs for the websites containing Can-
vas. The repository can be found on: https://github.com/abouollo/Canvas-
Prevalence.
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In the Canvas distinguishing capability empirical study, we gathered and stud-
ied the distinguishing capability of 23 Canvas samples to fingerprint users. We
summarized the the characteristics of each sample in Table 4.2 and provided the
output of how the samples look like when rendered using Google Chrome on
an HP 2000 Notebook that is running Microsoft Windows 10 and has Intel HD
Graphics 4000 as its graphics card in Appendix A. In addition to that, we cre-
ated a repository with the source code we used to draw each of the 23 samples,
and gave directions on how to use the code in a different website if someone
wishes to replicate our research or extend it. The repository can be found on:
https://github.com/abouollo/Canvas-Samples.
In the empirical study we performed to validate the technique we pro-
posed for detecting the creation of fake accounts on web applications, we
used Canvas sample number 1 on the Canvas Samples Github repository
https://github.com/abouollo/Canvas-Samples, however according to the
distinguishing capability analysis performed in Chapter 4, we expect Canvas sam-
ple number 20 to give better results (i.e. less false positives and negatives).
For the proof of concept built for the technique we proposed to prevent session
hijacking on web applications, we used sample number 1 on the Canvas Samples
Github repository. We also expect Canvas sample number 20 to give more effective
results.
That said, We see that there is a large room for enhancement in the Canvas
samples that can be used in tracking users, and in addition the two novel construc-
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tive applications we proposed for utilizing Canvas, it is possible to brainstorm and
study the effectiveness of more applications. The repositories we provide can help
as a starting point.
7.3 Conclusion
In this thesis we explored Canvas, one of the most powerful HTML features from
various perspective, looking at its history, support, and the functionality for which
Canvas was introduced, showing why it is a serious candidate to replace Flash
which is being discontinued for many security concerns. We demonstrated how
JavaScript is used to manipulate Canvas, and showed the API functions being
utilized for the tracking purposes, how they empower web applications developers,
and why these functions cannot be easily avoidable, which is the main basis of
this thesis.
We implemented a script that uses Selenium to scrape the top 100,000 Alexa
websites looking for the websites that contain Canvas element in the main source
HTML, any iframe, and any JavaScript component that is loaded with the landing
page of the websites. The result showed that the Canvas is very widespread, as
over 24% of the websites use this feature, and hence disabling it to protect users’
privacy comes with a large cost.
To understand the distinguishing capability of Canvas, we performed an em-
pirical study that included over 500 participants who provided their Canvas and
non-Canvas fingerprints. The main targets of this study are to compare the Can-
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vas samples to other widely used fingerprinting techniques, drafting guidelines
on how to enhance the Canvas samples, and to provide strong Canvas samples
in terms of distinguishing users. The results demonstrate how the various com-
ponents and characteristics of each of the 23 different Canvas samples gathered
impact the distinguishing capability of the sample. The enhanced Canvas sample
we proposed surpassed every other Canvas and non-Canvas fingerprint studied
by AmIUnique [1] and Panopticlick [21], and was able to raise the distinguishing
entropy from 0.49 to 0.83.
Moreover, we proposed two novel applications where Canvas fingerprint can
be constructively utilized to detect and prevent attacks. The first application is
to detect fake accounts creation on web applications through a two-stage process,
starting by storing the Canvas fingerprint at the time of account creation, fol-
lowed by a repetition checking stage to analyze and raise alerts for potential fake
accounts. To assess the effectiveness of our proposed methodology, we performed
an empirical study that included 148 accounts registered on a website we built.
The analysis resulted in 6.67% of false positives inaccuracy and 7.44% of false
negatives inaccuracy. The second application is a technique for session hijacking
prevention. We built a proof of concept to demonstrate how a vulnerable appli-
cation can be protected from session hijacking by our suggested mechanism. The
key benefit here is that these two techniques can be implemented in addition to
any existing techniques to achieve layered security.
This work also explores scenarios of how web applications can take advantage of
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Canvas fingerprint to attack the privacy and de-anonymize web users who could be
browsing through different devices and visiting separate web applications. These
scenarios included linking a guest user to a logged in user, concluding a person
or entity owns several accounts, identifying that several users are related (e.g.
family members, roommates, friends or classmates), concluding that a user owns
several devices, attributing activities done across different web applications to the
same user even when using different browsers on the same or different devices,
and confirming identity speculation.
7.4 Future Work
In the Canvas prevalence area, to overcome the threats to validity and to achieve
more accurate results, it is beneficial to replicate our Canvas prevalence experi-
ment for all purposes as well as replicate the Canvas prevalence only for tracking
purposes at the same time frame to avoid any potential impact of time in the
trends of the ever-changing web. To avoid the false positives we expect in our re-
search findings, it is important pay more attention to the obfuscation techniques
and find methods to overcome them. It can be useful to record the websites that
uses Canvas constructively and for tracking in the same web page.
For the Canvas distinguishing capability analysis, our research and analysis
were based on the fingerprinting data from 524 user visits. Although this dataset
gives an understanding of how the distinguishing capability of Canvas is increased
with the enhanced samples (especially with the normalized entropy), it is impor-
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tant to confirm the findings on a much larger dataset for more reliable results,
while trying to maintain less biased samples in terms of operating system and
web browser market share. The observations we found can also be utilized for
designing new Canvas samples that are even more in entropy.
In addition to that, we suggest selecting some of the most distinguishing Can-
vas samples and identify what the actual differences in the rendered pixels are.
This can be done by creating an animation that cycles fast through all the images
resulted from the dataset, or by constructing a big matrix where we subtract pairs
of images and highlight the pixels that differ. Accomplishing this could reveal the
underlying causes of the differences and lead to further principles.
Further more, we suggest deep investigations to identify the root causes of the
differences in pixel rendering. As starting points, we recommend to record and
analyze the system calls triggered by the rendering of different Canvas samples
(e.g. one sample can be an empty Canvas while another may have some simple
component, or two samples the vary in complexity). System calls are the way via
which an application requests services from the kernel of the operating system.
By analyzing the differences in the type and the amount of triggered system calls
when rendering different Canvas samples, it may be possible to identify the main
factors contributing to the pixel differences. This can help quantify the extent to
which each hardware components like CPU, GPU and graphics card or software
configurations like operating systems and browser types and versions contribute
to the overall differences in the rendered Canvas.
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We proposed the fake account creation detection application via Canvas, and
tested the effectiveness based on 148 registered accounts created by 14 partici-
pants. This experiment can be repeated on a larger scale of audience to confirm
the effectiveness. It is also important to study how a malicious user can defeat
our proposed technique (by methods like Canvas URL Data randomization) and
implement defences against that.
We also proposed and implemented a session hijacking prevention technique
utilizing Canvas. This implementation we provided only accommodates an ac-
count login from a single browser at a time. This implementation can be enhanced
to allow simultaneous legitimate logins while continuing to detect session hijack-
ing. Calculating the overhead of this technique and quantifying the dissatisfaction
that may be caused by this protection measure are open research areas to consider
in future research.
It would be valuable to address the destructive use cases of Canvas, as the
attack scenarios are shown in diagrams and explained theoretically. Designing and
performing empirical studies can better assess the effectiveness of these scenarios,
and measure the potential overhead.
Finally, utilizing the GitHub repositories we provide would help in replicating
all the empirical studies performed in this research, and is going to provide more
trustworthiness to our findings.
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[7] T. Bujlow, V. Carela-Español, J. Sole-Pareta, and P. Barlet-Ros, “A survey
on web tracking: Mechanisms, implications, and defenses,” Proceedings of
the IEEE, vol. 105, no. 8, pp. 1476–1510, 2017.
[8] E. Mills, “Device identication in online banking is privacy threat, expert
says.” https://www.cnet.com/news/device-identification-in-online-banking-
is-privacy-threat-expert-says/, April 2009, [Online; posted 24-April-2009].
[9] S. Macbeth, “Tracking the trackers: Analysing the global tracking landscape
with ghostrank,” Technical report, Ghostery, Tech. Rep., 2017.
[10] G. Team, “Tracking the trackers.” [Online]. Available:
https://www.ghostery.com/lp/study/
[11] P. E. Ketelaar and M. van Balen, “The smartphone as your follower: The role
of smartphone literacy in the relation between privacy concerns, attitude and
behaviour towards phone-embedded tracking,” Computers in Human Behav-
ior, vol. 78, pp. 174–182, 2018.
[12] A. Hannak, G. Soeller, D. Lazer, A. Mislove, and C. Wilson, “Measuring
price discrimination and steering on e-commerce web sites,” in Proceedings
of the 2014 conference on internet measurement conference. ACM, 2014,
pp. 305–318.
107
[13] J. Mikians, L. Gyarmati, V. Erramilli, and N. Laoutaris, “Detecting price
and search discrimination on the internet,” in Proceedings of the 11th ACM
Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks. acm, 2012, pp. 79–84.
[14] ——, “Crowd-assisted search for price discrimination in e-commerce: First
results,” in Proceedings of the ninth ACM conference on Emerging networking
experiments and technologies. acm, 2013, pp. 1–6.
[15] K. Lobosco, “Facebook friends could change your credit score,” CNN,
https://money.cnn.com/2013/08/26/technology/social/facebook-credit-
score/index.html?hpt=hp t2, 2013.
[16] “Very personal finance,” Jun 2012. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2012/06/02/very-
personal-finance
[17] “How the nsa piggy-backs on third-party trackers,” Nov 2013. [Online].
Available: http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/how-nsa-piggy-backs-
third-party-trackers
[18] T.-F. Yen, Y. Xie, F. Yu, R. P. Yu, and M. Abadi, “Host fingerprinting and
tracking on the web: Privacy and security implications.” in NDSS, 2012.
[19] S. Englehardt, D. Reisman, C. Eubank, P. Zimmerman, J. Mayer,
A. Narayanan, and E. W. Felten, “Cookies that give you away: The surveil-
lance implications of web tracking,” in Proceedings of the 24th International
Conference on World Wide Web. ACM, 2015, pp. 289–299.
108
[20] A. Soltani, S. Canty, Q. Mayo, L. Thomas, and C. J. Hoofnagle, “Flash
cookies and privacy.” in AAAI spring symposium: intelligent information
privacy management, vol. 2010, 2010, pp. 158–163.
[21] P. Eckersley, “How unique is your web browser?” in Privacy Enhancing
Technologies, vol. 6205. Springer, 2010, pp. 1–18.
[22] R. Upathilake, Y. Li, and A. Matrawy, “A classification of web browser finger-
printing techniques,” in New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS),
2015 7th International Conference on. IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–5.
[23] N. Nikiforakis, A. Kapravelos, W. Joosen, C. Kruegel, F. Piessens, and G. Vi-
gna, “Cookieless monster: Exploring the ecosystem of web-based device fin-
gerprinting,” in Security and privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE symposium on. IEEE,
2013, pp. 541–555.
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The screenshots were taken from Google Chrome (64bit) 62.0.3202.94 on Mi-
crosoft Windows 10 Home Single Language (Version 10.0.15063 Build 15063).
The laptop model is HP 2000 Notebook PC. Graphics Card: Intel HD Graphics
4000.
Canvas Sample 1:
Contains the sentence ”I love InfoSec” written in the font “Arial” with size
18 pt, followed by an emoji.
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Canvas Sample 2:
Two stroke rectangles (with round edges and different line widths) and two
filled rectangles. All the shapes are in black, have different positions and
dimensions, and some of them overlapping.
Canvas Sample 3:
Two stroke rectangles with round edges and different line widths, and two
filled rectangles, one of which is transparent. All the shapes have different
colors, positions and dimensions, and some of them overlapping.
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Canvas Sample 4:
Linear gradient with 5 color stops.
Canvas Sample 5:
Linear gradient with 5 color stops in the background. Two stroke rectangles
with round edges and different line widths, and two filled rectangles, one of
which is transparent. All the shapes have different colors, positions and
dimensions, and some of them overlapping.
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Canvas Sample 6:
Radial gradient with 5 color stops in the background.
Canvas Sample 7:
Radial gradient with 5 color stops in the background. Two stroke rectangles
with round edges and different line widths, and two filled rectangles, one of
which is transparent. All the shapes have different colors, positions and
dimensions, and some of them overlapping.
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Canvas Sample 8:
Two stroke rectangles with round edges and different line widths, and two
filled rectangles. All the shapes have different positions and dimensions, and
some of them overlapping. The shapes are colored with a gradient of 5 color
stops.
Canvas Sample 9:
Linear gradient with 5 color stops in the background. Two stroke rectangles
with round edges and different line widths, and two filled rectangles, one of
which is transparent. All the shapes have shadows, different colors, positions
and dimensions, and some of them overlapping.
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Canvas Sample 10:
All the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 25 characters,
printed in the font “Arial” with a size of 18. This sample is to mimic a
sample in [3].
Canvas Sample 11:
All the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 25 characters,




All the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 25 characters,
printed in the font “Sirin Stencil” from the Google Web Fonts server with a
size of 12. This sample is to mimic a sample in [3].
Canvas Sample 13:
All the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 25 characters,
printed in the font “Sirin Stencil” from the Google Web Fonts server with a
size of 15. This sample is to mimic a sample in [3].
120
Canvas Sample 14:
All the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 25 characters,
with a non-existent specified font “Fake-Font-Name” with a size of 18. This
sample is to mimic a sample in [3].
Canvas Sample 15:
All the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 25 characters,
printed in the font “Sedgwick Ave Display” from the Google Web Fonts
server with a size of 18.
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Canvas Sample 16:
All the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 25 characters,
printed in the font “Gloria Hallelujah” from the Google Web Fonts server
with a size of 18.
Canvas Sample 17:
All the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 25 characters,
printed in the local windows font “Palatino Linotype” with a size of 18.
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Canvas Sample 18:
21 different selected emojis.
Canvas Sample 19:
Linear gradient with 5 color stops in the background. Stroke rectangles and
filled rectangles, one of which is transparent. All the shapes have shadows,
different colors, positions and dimensions, and some of them are overlapping.
On top of that are all the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers,
and 25 characters, printed twice in the fonts “Palatino Linotype” (a
Windows font) and “Sedgwick Ave Display” from Google Web Fonts with a
size of 25. In addition to 21 different selected emojis.
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Canvas Sample 20:
Linear gradient with 5 color stops in the background. Two stroke rectangles with
round edges and different line widths, and two filled rectangles, one of which is
transparent. All shapes have shadows, different colors, positions and dimensions,
some of them overlapping. On top of that are all the alphabetical letters in capital
and small, numbers, 25 characters, printed twice in the Windows local fonts
“Palatino Linotype” and “Arial” with a size of 25, and 21 different emojis.
Canvas Sample 21:
All the alphabetical letters in small and many of them in capital printed
overlapping in blue and green, with a little orange rectangle in the background.
This sample is similar in concept to the ones presented in [4] and [1].
124
Canvas Sample 22:
All the alphabetical letters in capital and small, numbers, and 30 characters
printed overlapping in blue and green, with a little orange rectangle in the
background. This sample is similar in concept to the ones in [4] and [1].
Canvas Sample 23:
A landscape picture printed on a Canvas.
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Canvas Widely Used:
This image was re-generated from the Canvas DataURL stored by the
multi-factor algorithm in Table 4.1, using an online converter. It is similar to
our Canvas sample 21.
126
Vitae
• Name: Ahmed Abouollo
• Nationality: Egyptian (Saudi Mother)
• Date of Birth: November 29, 1992
• Email: a.abouollo@gmail.com
• Permanent Address: Alkhobar, Saudi Arabia
• Previous Education: Bachelor of Science (B.S.) in Software Engineering,
from King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
• Research Interest:




– Security Operation Centers (SOC) Establishment
– Digital Identity
127
